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Mart Stewart-Smith
Hatfield School of Government
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the state of Middle East Track-II projects since the 1990s, the failure
of the ACRS working group, and how a better understanding of security norms and public
opinion can improve Track-II collaboration and produce long-term results. The first section of
the paper provides a summary of NGO activities, and how their work relates to the development
of a regional security regime. The projects featured in this paper are by no means exhaustive,
but are intended to represent the variety of forms and objectives Track-II efforts have
traditionally taken in the region. The second section provides a review of perspectives on
international norm diffusion and the influence of public opinion on policymaking. Building on
this foundation, the third section provides an outline of the goals, structure and composition of an
unofficial regional security coalition between NGO partners in the Middle East.
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Introduction
This paper is an attempt to address shortcomings in existing Middle East security regime
literature by providing a short-term recommendation for how to influence the long-term future of
Middle East security. The primary components of the paper include a concise review of notable
NGO activities in the Middle East since the early nineties, an analysis of prominent perspectives
on security regime development, international norm development and diffusion, and the
relationship between public opinion and policymaking. From this foundation, the last section of
the paper outlines the goals, structure, and composition of an unofficial NGO coalition for the
Middle East, including a consideration of the barriers to developing such a coalition.
Through this approach to Middle East security and diplomacy, I hope to get around some
of the recurring hurdles common to discussions of the Middle East, both in the media and
academia. For example, consider a recent publication from the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, “Seizing the Opportunity to Create a WMD-free Middle East.”1 The
article hails an upcoming conference in Finland as a possible “cornerstone for a new regional
security architecture” for the Middle East. The path to success through this official forum is
supposed to be simple: first, participation from every state in the region must be secured,
including that of Iran and Israel; second, all participants must demonstrate a readiness to
compromise on reasonable guidelines for regional cooperation; finally, extra-regional sponsor
states (the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom) must demonstrate a commitment to
the principles a goals developed by the regional participants. Summits of this sort are not
unique. Time and again governments agree to meet, with varying degrees of regional inclusivity,

1

Tamim Khallaf (2012). “Seizing the Opportunity to Create a WMD-free Middle East” found online at
http://cns.miis.edu/wmdjunction/120417_mideast_wmdfz.htm last accessed May 18, 2012
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and they stumble over the same issues in each instance. The cycle continues. Governments
meet, disagree on guiding principles, and progress fades.

Figure1: Regional relations under status
quo

Figure 1 is a simplified representation of the interactions between various official and
unofficial institutions under the status quo. The three governments portrayed above interact with
elite members of the public, identified above as business elites, social elites (this may include
religious leaders or media figures), and interest groups (including the “attentive public” which
will be examined later). In this model, NGOs and the track II projects they sponsor have little
room for influence. In some cases they are permitted to interact with government officials, or
they sponsor public engagement programs, but in both cases they operate in isolation from other
NGOs, and so have only a limited sphere of influence. On the periphery are the regional publics,
informed exclusively by media inputs with little or no recourse for policy engagement. Note that
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media entities are highly influenced and controlled by governments. As a simplified model there
are of course exceptions, but as a portrayal of security relations in the Middle East, this provides
a useful visualization of the last few decades of security negotiations.
Official approaches under the status quo, in the framework illustrated in figure 1, fail for
two reasons not usually addressed by contributors to security policy literature. First, before
progressive concessions can occur, and guiding principles for a regional security regime can be
agreed upon, there must be a unified, normative foundation in the region. States must agree on
certain norms of military and diplomatic behavior. These norms need not be as deeply rooted as
they are, for example, among European states, but they must at least be widely accepted in the
region. Secondly, regional publics are often opposed to dramatic changes in security relations
between adversarial governments; most notably consider Israel, Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Iran.
To illustrate this point, at points later in the paper I discuss examples from both the failure of
talks sponsored by the Search for Common Ground in 1993, and later, the failure of Camp David
talks in 2000.
By describing a NGO coalition model for the Middle East, this paper attempts to provide
a possible solution to both the norms and public opinion barriers by turning to regional NGOs
and the potential for expanding and integrating track II projects. Before exploring details of an
NGO coalition in the Middle East, consider the following example from the Asia Pacific region.
The Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is a network of security
institutes who help structure and guide a regional discourse on security policy.2 The Council was
founded in 1993 after a meeting of two dozen security institutes from ten countries (Australia,
Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the
2

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. 2012, last accessed May 1, 2012 <www.cscap.org>.
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USA) determined that a coordinated effort would provide a useful perspective on the securityrelated proceedings of ASEAN. The CSCAP attends to a variety of issue areas, including
CSBM, comprehensive and cooperative security, transnational crime, maritime security
cooperation, and preventive diplomacy. Four working groups are currently operating under the
CSCAP: Cybersecurity as a central strategy for securing the cyber environment in the Asia
Pacific region, water resources in mainland Southeast Asia, multilateral security governance in
Northeast Asia/North Pacific, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in
the Asia Pacific. The existence and success of the CSCAP is a hopeful sign for developing a
similar organization in the Middle East, however the existing organization and the proposal for
the Middle East differ in one important way. The unofficial network of NGOs in East Asia was
founded in the wake of ASEAN, a stable and effective official regime. This ordering of events
has an effect on the activities of the NGO coalition by way of the level of support received from
host governments. The CSCAP is intended to augment the ongoing work of government
collaboration, whereas in the Middle East, the NGO coalition would spend considerable time
working to create government collaboration, in the hope of someday establishing an organization
similar to ASEAN. The lesson of the CSCAP is that an NGO coalition can work, but it should
be understood that the task in the Middle East will be more challenging. Consider figure 2 for a
visualization of how an NGO coalition can successfully overlay with government, media, and
public relations in a region.

9 Stewart-Smith

Figure 2: regional relations with
integrated track II coalition

Figure 2 provides a visualization of regional relations with the development of an
unofficial NGO coalition. First, it should be noted that the increased number of track II projects
in figure 2 compared to figure 1 is not necessarily an increase in the number of NGOs operating
in the region, but is instead intended to illustrate the sustained presence of track II projects that
are integrated in the coalition. As I will discuss later, one of the greatest failings of current NGO
projects is the inability to sustain a given project beyond a handful of meetings and, in some
cases, a single publication. The advantage of the integrated track II approach is the ability to
create a sustained regional presence through coordination between coalition participants and the
sharing of resources. Figure 2 shows a selection of possible types of engagement offered by
existing track II projects, each of which are strengthened by participation in the coalition. Some
projects focus specifically on public engagement, others work to provide a forum for regional
10 Stewart-Smith

dialogue between government and NGO representatives. Perhaps most importantly is the
increases communication with regional media outlets provided by the collaborative efforts of the
coalition. The thickness of the arrows in figure 2 indicates the differences in influence and
media saturation that can be achieved by governments as compared to NGOs. A comparison of
figures 1 and 2 shows the intended effect of the track II coalition proposal.
When track-II projects in the Middle East have occurred over the last two decades they
function almost identically as their official counterparts, especially in cases where government
representatives are present. Because they operate the same way, these projects are vulnerable to
the same weaknesses inherent in government relations. State interests and entrenched rhetoric
keep governments in the Middle East apart. Track-II programs ought the be able to capitalize
more effectively on what makes them fundamentally different from official government
programs; NGOs are not restricted by state interests, their current operations show a willingness
to engage across the region, and their work makes an effort to transcend debilitating state
rhetoric. In order to better realize the potential of these attributes it is necessary to forge a
coalition of NGO partners that is regionally inclusive and that can lay a foundation for a future of
stable government relations. In examining the existing work on regime theory, norm diffusion,
and public opinion, the remainder of the paper discusses how the coalition ought to operate (as
depicted in figure 2) and what NGO cooperation stands to achieve.
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Part I: Review of NGO Involvement in the Middle East
What are Track-II Negotiations?

Track-II negotiations, track-II diplomacy, or citizens’ diplomacy describe activities in
which nongovernmental organizations (NGO) engage in dialogue to address policy issues
traditionally reserved for governments. In contrast, track-I negotiations are those between
official government representatives. Three stages exist in the track-II process: socialization,
filtering, and policy realization.3 In the first stage, the typically small group of participants in
track-II dialogues, involving primarily individuals affiliated with NGOs, but sometimes
including government elites acting in an unofficial capacity, begins discussing a specific policy
issue. If the dialogue is successful, a sort of group socialization occurs in which direct
participants in the dialogue are more supportive of the conclusive recommendation than their
counterparts who did not participate. The second stage, the filtering process, involves the
translation of policy recommendations to the outside world. Typically this involves participants
returning to their respective countries and working with government officials to build consensus
in support of the track-II recommendation. The final stage, which is often not achieved, is the
successful enactment of the policy recommended by the track-II participants.
The remainder of this section reviews some of the most notable track-II activities in the
Middle East since the early 1990s. With the end of the Madrid peace process, and later the
collapse of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, a variety of
unofficial educational projects, conferences and summits were sponsored by newly formed

3

Dalia Dassa Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: TrackTwo Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007) xii
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organizations and coalitions. Although many of these efforts operated independently from each
other, with differing missions, funding sources, and participants, the overarching motivations
were often similar; in the absence of official dialogue, it was vital to maintain communications
between policymakers and other elites in the region in order to keep the peace process alive and
prevent region from becoming increasingly fractured. One of the most detailed accounts of
Middle East Track-II efforts is presented by Dalia Dassa Kaye. For a more exhaustive account
of activities in the 1990s, see Michael Yaffe’s earlier publication.4
Track-II events in the Middle East are typically in the form of unofficial diplomatic
meetings between security elites and academics. In some cases the purpose of the event is to
produce a research report on specific security-related subjects. Distribution of these reports is
usually limited to governments, policy research institutes, and other elite stakeholders. Although
many participants in Track-II events acknowledge the importance of communications with the
media about their activities, this facet of dissemination is often the most lacking, while
potentially being most crucial.5 Track-II dialogues and research endeavors engage with a variety
of subject areas relating to security studies, including, but not limited to military technology,
military communication, economics, development, resource scarcity, and religion. Discussion
and analysis of each of these subjects can vary depending on the regional scope of the approach.
Peter Jones divides track-II activities in the Middle East into three categories.6 First, there are
projects that pursue sub-regional security arrangements by engaging exclusively with either Gulf
or Mediterranean states. Second are those seeking to establish a region-wide security regime,

4

Kaye 2007; Michael D. Yaffe. 2001. “Promoting Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East,”
Disarmament Forum, 2001; Peter Jones. “Filling a Critical Gap, or Just Wasting Time: Track Two Diplomacy and
Regional Security in the Middle East,” Disarmament Forum, 2008.
5
Interview with Paul Walker (Ph.D.), August, 2011.
6
Peter Jones, Towards a Regional Security Regimes for the Middle East: Issues and Options, report of the SIPRI
Middle East Expert Group (Sweden: SIPRI, 2011) 47
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with the potential to develop sub-regional arrangements as components of the greater whole.
Lastly, some efforts emphasize specific security-related subjects and do not address the scope of
geographical participation. The case studies presented later in Part I include examples of each
type of approach. For the proposed track II coalition, it will be important that examples of each
type of approach are included. Looking back to figure 2, recall that it is valuable to include a
diversity of approaches to regional integration; certain NGOs focusing specifically on creating
forums for policy dialogue, while partner NGOs assist in the dissemination of information to the
public. Likewise is it valuable to include NGOs that operate regionally, sub-regionally, or in
specific policy areas, as described by Jones. Each approach has certain strengths and none
should be ruled out at the expense of another.
Before reviewing examples of NGO activities in the Middle East, it is worth noting that it
can be difficult to identify specifics about the policy options under review at track-II events.
Under the status quo, the political sensitivity of regional security is of concern for many of the
elites who opt to participate in unofficial dialogues; information concerning the content of such
discussion is often withheld from public scrutiny. This information asymmetry perpetuates the
strained relations between publics and governments, and it is among the goals of the proposed
coalition to provide an improved filtering process in order to break the pattern of failed track II
projects. Of more immediate practical concern is the difficulty this presents when writing about
track II projects. For this reason, the featured examples emphasize the subject issues,
composition, and funding of each project, and only in some cases provide details concerning
security policy proposals and analysis.
The following examples were selected not only for their notoriety, but for the diversity of
their approaches. Each of the following Track-II initiatives represents an important role
14 Stewart-Smith

nongovernmental organizations are able to play in the Middle East. Many projects are of the
traditional sort described above, involving an assembly of regional and extra-regional
representatives who analyze security issues and develop policy recommendations. Within this
traditional approach there are often important variances in regional inclusion, media interaction,
and dissemination of results. Other approaches attempt to develop partnerships with NGOs
expressing a common purpose in order to share in resources and to expand their influence. Still
others focus on the technical side of regional security. These organizations work with regional
leaders to facilitate either the sharing of technology or research collaboration with a design to
build trust in the region and potentially create effective confidence and security building
measures. Each of the following examples illustrate drawbacks and advantages to the Track-II
approach to regional security, and will be informative in the later discussion of a track-II regional
coalition.

The Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
Following the end of the Madrid peace process, the Institute on Global Conflict and
Cooperation (IGCC) began hosting track-II events in the Middle East.7 The IGCC hosts events
with the intention of building regional relationships between political elites. In the Early 1990s,
the IGCC events mirrored the activities of the multilateral peace process, and therefore addressed
a range of topics including arms control, regional security, the environment, water scarcity,
refugees, and economic development.8 Following the collapse of the ACRS working group the
IGCC began to focus exclusively on military dialogue, including force postures, military balance
of power, weapons effects, arms control, counter proliferation measures, military ethics, and
7

University of California Institute on global Conflict and Cooperation. 2011. <http://igcc.ucsd.edu/policy/track-iiforums/middle-east-dialogues.htm> last viewed on March 11, 2012.
8
Kaye 2007. p36
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military education. The events with the largest scope are biannual meetings averaging 300
participants. These meetings draw professionals from every Middle Eastern country, Iran,
Turkey, the United States, and a variety of European nations. Additional meetings include those
between exclusively active and retired military personnel. Participants in these smaller dialogues
include the same countries, with the exception of Iran, which has not had a military
representative present at any of the recent meetings. The smaller meetings focus on specific
diplomatic and security issues, many of which involve discussions of sensitive government
information, and therefore reports are not made publicly accessible. The primary source of
funding for these events historically comes from the United States and Greek governments.

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences
The most relevant events hosted by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
(AAAS) occurred in the early 1990s, but it should be noted that the AAAS continues to be
involved in security dialogues in the United States, typically limited to U.S. policymakers and
professionals.9 The first Middle East meeting hosted by the AAAS was in 1992.10 Around this
time the AAAS also participated in joint efforts with the Foundation for International Security
(FIS), which hosted an event in June of 1992 in Adderbury, England, and the Israel Palestine
Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), which hosted an event in London in October 1992.
The AAAS talks continued from 1992 to 1994 in six formal sessions. The focus of this series of
talks was arrival at a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis on some of their most pressing
security issues relating to the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. Participants in these

9

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 2011. http://cstsp.aaas.org/event.html?bydatepast=1&s=360&np=33
last accessed on March 12, 2012
10
Āghā, Ḥusayn, and Shai Feldman. Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East. Cambridge, MA: MIT,
2003.
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meetings included U.S. academics, only some of whom were directly affiliated with AAAS,
Israeli academics, a retired Israeli government official, and Palestinian security experts,
including one PLO official.
This project was notable for two reasons. Firstly, the format of the meetings allowed
Israeli and Palestinian representatives to confer in a setting that placed their mutual security
concerns on an equal footing. According to Hussein Agha (Agha et. al. 2003), the AAAS talks
were unprecedented in that they allowed Palestinian security specialists to present their views to
a specialized Israeli and U.S. audience. Prior to this experience, the security dialogue in the
U.S., Europe, and Israel was dominated by an Israeli perspective on Middle Eastern security.
This was an important opportunity to present the unique and often marginalized security
concerns of the Palestinian leadership, given the asymmetry of power between the parties. The
security concerns of both parties were considered “parallel prerequisites” to any possible
settlement concerning an Israeli withdrawal. On the Israeli side these concerns included worries
that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) would be unable to prevent an increase in
military activities in the West Bank and Gaza, and that potential inter-Palestinian conflict could
spill over into Israel. Palestinian security concerns focused on Israeli settlements, and in the
same vein, the potential for conservative revanchism to influence future Israeli policies toward
Palestine.
The second unique characteristic of the AAAS talks, and the most important with regard
to later sections of this essay, is the distinction between two different meeting groups within the
single process. This structure could be thought of as a small track-II channel within a broader,
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more inclusive track-II forum.11 Besides the main six meetings, there were smaller unofficial
meetings which did not include AAAS moderators or U.S. academics, and instead provided an
opportunity for Israeli and Palestinian representatives to discuss and clarify issues that may have
arisen in one of the main sessions. Ultimately the AAAS process was overshadowed by the Oslo
talks, and the PLO decided to minimize the potential for confusion by only participating in one
negotiating process, and so declined to continue participating in AAAS meetings.

The AAAS Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy
The Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy (CSTSP) works to facilitate
communication between members of the security and science and technology fields in order to
foster a better understanding of intentions, objectives, modes of operation, and potential
advancements.12 The CSTSP is presently in the planning process for a third and fourth round of
meetings, to be located in Tunisia and Egypt respectively, between science and technology
experts in the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In a recent presentation,
Dr. Gwenaёle Coat, Senior Program Associate of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, discussed the purpose of these meetings in addressing critical issues
pertaining to security and international collaboration in the biological sciences.13 At the first
meetings in Jordan and Kuwait, scientists in the region identified three primary policy concerns.
First, insufficient funding and institutional support for many doctoral and post-doctoral programs
leads to ongoing “brain drain.” Secondly, scientists and policymakers do not forge strong
relationships, resulting in poor communication and coordination on vital policy concerns.
11

Ibid. p68
AAAS Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy.2011. http://cstsp.aaas.org/ last accessed March 12,
2012
13
Information from a presentation by Dr. Gwenaёle Coat and Dr. Chen Kane on July 15, 2011, hosted by the Global
Green USA, Security and Sustainability Program in Washington, D.C. A summary of the event is available at
http://globalgreen.org/press/194.
12
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Finally, there is not an established legal framework in the region to facilitate the exchange of
expertise and research. The inability to effectively collaborate within the region hampers the
capacity of research institutions and governments to respond to some of their shared problems,
such as the spread of infectious and chronic diseases.
Certainly one of the smaller track-II projects currently operating in the Middle East, the
CSTSP program nonetheless draws attention to the variety of security issues present in the
region. At the same event as Dr. Gwenaёle Coat’s presentation, Dr. Chen Kane, Senior Research
Associate of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, presented a response to some
of the concerns advanced in the CSTSP meetings. Kane proposed that the Middle East is
uniquely disadvantaged compared to other regions because it does not have an established
intergovernmental organization. Such a regional organization could bring governments together
to collaborate on important security policies. Instead, it may be more feasible to move forward
with either bilateral, sub-regional, or regional policy dialogues, so long as the “lowest common
denominator” can be agreed upon. This entails identifying a common area of concern upon
which a new policy regime can develop. Kane’s four components of a successful process
included (a) the identification of each state’s threat perception, (b) engagement with local
stakeholders at an early stage so that their involvement can help sustain the effort, (c) foreign
parties participating in discussions must learn from past mistakes and avoid overstep, and lastly
(d) a regional program must include the ability to track member progress and to verify that
established policies have the desired effect.
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The Chemical Weapons Conventional Coalition
The Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition (CWCC) is a young and growing network
of NGOs dedicated to the elimination of chemical weapons. The CWCC was founded in 2009
under the leadership of Global Green USA. The explicit mission of the CWCC is to promote the
universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Currently the states remaining
outside the CWC include Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria.
The CWCC is included in this analysis because as an organization they have identified the
Middle East as a priority, as three of the most influential states in the region are outside the
Convention. On April 13, 2011, the CWCC held its second general session at the Technical
Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The meeting
included 19 NGOs from 14 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas.14 Today, the
CWCC includes 50 members, with the hope of doubling membership within the coming year.15
Although they have yet to hold a summit of the Coalition in the Middle East, there are tentative
plans for the summer of 2012.
The CWCC is notable, despite being relatively unproven as a Track-II arms control
forum, because of its coalition structure. Hopefully, the CWCC network will be able to continue
expanding, especially with regard to partnerships with NGOs and security studies program in the
Middle East. As it stands, and as is the case with most Track-II projects, the biggest hurdle for
the CWCC is the identification of funding sources. Global Green USA has submitted a variety
of grant proposals to help support the potential 2012 conference, mostly to delegations to the
14

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “OPCW Hosts Second General Meeting of the
Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition.” April 15, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcwhosts-2nd-general-meeting-of-chemical-weapons-convention-coalition/ last accessed March 13, 2012
15
Interview with Dr. Paul Walker Ph.D., Program Director, Global Green USA, Security and Sustainability
Program.
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OPCW. The most substantial proposal is currently to Norway for $3 million to support CWCC
conferences over the next three years.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has contributed to Track-II
projects in a number of ways since the 1990s, including working groups dedicated to developing
confidence building measures for the Middle East, and the feasibility of constructing an
electronic network for security and arms control issues. However, SIPRI made its most
substantial contribution to Track-II efforts in the Middle East with their report analyzing the
potential establishment of a Middle East security Regime.16 The report was the product of a
series of meetings of an expert group which met four times from 1997 to 1998. Peter Jones, one
of the more prolific writers in the area of Middle East security and Track-II negotiation, was the
project organizer. After meetings were concluded, Jones toured the region distributing the report
and sharing the conclusions of the expert group with regional parties.17 The report from the
expert group was republished in 2011 to include a new introduction and afterward from Peter
Jones.
The SIPRI report outlined a number of recommendations for the establishment of a
regional security regime, starting with guiding principles. The first principle outlined in the
report is the necessary establishment of regional security norms. These norms should provide
the foundation for a security regime to address present and future policy concerns. These norms
should “compliment and expand upon” the norms outlined by the United Nations Charter, but

16

Kaye 2007
Peter Jones. 2011. "The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group: Still Relevant to the Middle East?"
EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
17
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maintain relevance to the specific security conditions of the Middle East. The expert group made
it explicitly clear in the report that they sought to avoid restricting the flexibility of states
participating in the establishment of the security regime by creating overly burdensome guiding
principles and prerequisites. The report also included some recommended steps toward a
regional security regime. First and foremost, it will be necessary to make progress in the peace
process before a viable security regime can be established, but regional policymakers should
begin the process of developing a framework for a regime that would satisfy their particular
interests. The regime, when established, will not include all regional parties. It will therefore be
necessary to create a flexible, or “geometry variable” framework that will allow new
membership, so long as they are willing to accept the already established principles of the
existing regime. The issues identified by participants should account for all concerns of member
states, but the timeline for addressing these concerns must be flexible.
The work of the expert group is also notable because of the composition of its
membership. In geographical terms, many significant regional participants are accounted for:
Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Morocco, Jordan, Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey. Also included
in the group were participants from Sweden, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Russia. The
composition of the group is well reflected in their report; the regional representation grounds the
conclusions of the group firmly in an accurate presentation of regional conditions and
sensitivities, while the extra-regional participants provided insight into precedent-setting security
regimes with which they have prior experience. Although the participants did not include any
official government contributors, many of them hail from institutes in their home countries
specializing in security or defense studies.
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The Search for Common Ground
The Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is notable not only because of the
organization’s well established history of peace facilitation and advocacy, but because they
maintain regional offices in the Middle East as part of their Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) program.18 The SFCG currently maintains operations in Israel, Lebanon, and Morocco.
Until recently they also had offices in Tunisia and Yemen. The SFCG work in Lebanon and
Morocco focuses primarily on civil issues. Their office in Jerusalem, established in 2000,
promotes the development of positive relationships between Palestinians and Israelis through a
variety of multi-track programs. Many of the programs housed in the Jerusalem office
emphasize media engagement and interfaith dialogue and advocacy.19
Although the project is no longer active today, the SFCG sponsored a program from 1992
to 1994 called the Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the Middle East (IPCME), now known
as the as the Search for Common Ground in the Middle East. In this series of talks Israeli and
Palestinian representatives developed a set of security arrangements that might have been
successful in resolving the Syrian-Israeli peace process, if it had not been cut short.20 The SFCG
was the only organization to have been successful in establishing a working framework for such
a process. Unfortunately, in December 1993, talks were derailed by press leaks, and so
prevented any real conclusion from being reached.21 Agha provides four critiques of the TrackII process in an attempt to explain the failure of this SFCG project. First, many of the Syrians
participating in the dialogue had little experience with security policy, and so were poorly
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positioned to usefully contribute to policy development. Second, Track-II negotiations are often
extremely vulnerable to leaks. In the same vein, a third critique is the asymmetry between the
parties. Israeli representatives were not official members of the government, whereas the Syrian
participants were, thus making them significantly more vulnerable. Lastly, there were no clearly
identified mentors. In Agha’s approach, mentors are individuals who serve to both facilitate
discussion and relay developments from talks back to governments and interested parties.
Conflict resolution does not take place in a vacuum, so it is vital to maintain ongoing dialogue
with parties not directly engaged in the process. In the absence of mentors, Track-II negotiations
are likely to fall short of their potential.
More recently, the SFCG hosted Madrid +15, which took place in Madrid from January
10-12, 2007. The conference included representatives from Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The conference was held in commemoration of the 15th
anniversary of the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference. The most touted result from the
brief series of meetings was an agreement among the assembled parties that “there is a need to
firmly reassert the spirit of Madrid 1991” and that “participants called for a return to negotiations
and for an official International Peace Conference.”22 It is interesting to consider the differences
between the two projects. The 1993 talks were considered a failure, whereas those in 2007 were
an apparent success. Clearly, the difference is not the product, but the scope and ambition of the
goals set out to guide the two processes, by which failure or success are determined.
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The Cooperative Monitoring Center
Sandia National Laboratories opened the doors of the Cooperative Monitoring Center
(CMC) in 1994 with the hope that if more security experts in more countries were made aware of
available monitoring technology, they might be more amenable to regional security
arrangements. Few countries, especially those in the Middle East, possess the resources and
technical expertise necessary to develop monitoring technology that could provide verification of
arms control regime adherence.23 During the 1990s the role of CMC was largely educational. In
July 1994, the CMC hosted a workshop attended by representatives of military, governmental,
and academic institutions in Israel, Egypt, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait. The purpose of the
workshop was to provide a forum in which regional leaders could meet with each other and
representatives from the U.S. to share monitoring techniques and technology.24 The hope was to
provide a foundation for the development of confidence and security building measures that
could support an eventual arms control agreement or a new regional security regime. In 1996,
the CMC hosted representatives from Egypt, Jordan, and Israel to review options for a Weapons
of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ). A number of similar events took place throughout
the 1990s and into the early 2000s, some of which were in partnership with government
departments (e.g. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Energy).
In October of 2003 a new CMC opened in Amman, Jordan. In a region of the world
more prone to violent conflict and cold government relations, the mission of the center was to
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promote a culture of trust.25 Many of the activities hosted by the CMC in Amman are modeled
after its predecessor at Sandia. The specific regional issues emphasized by the center include
border security and management, non-proliferation of WMD, public health, resource
management, and environmental security.

Part II: Building a Regional Security Coalition: The Application of Theory

As illustrated by the expert group in the SIPRI report, and reiterated by Peter Jones in the
2011 republication of their report, one of the primary goals of a regional security regime should
be the development of new security norms.26 By allowing parties to the regime to collaborate on
their shared concerns, new behaviors will spread and gradually become the natural means of
interaction between governments. Unfortunately, given the current political state of the Middle
East, there are only three paths to the establishment of a security regime. The first, and most
likely, is the creation of a small coalition of states who will set out semi-inclusive guiding
principles that would allow the coalition to grow until it encompasses each state in the region.
Unfortunately, the creation of such a regime today would likely develop along existing political
lines, and fail to grow into an inclusive body. A second, and more abstract approach, would
require multiple instances of extraordinary political leadership and risk-taking. If the political
leadership of Israel, Syria, Egypt, and Iran were to jointly decide to enter into a security
arrangement, including monitoring systems and an array of confidence building measures, it
25
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would almost certainly provide a foundation for a regionally inclusive regime. Of course, the
confluence of conditions necessary for this approach to be successful is unlikely enough to be
prohibitive. Consider the well-known example of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and
Israel, the product of the previous year’s negotiations at Camp David. Signed in Washington
D.C. by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the 1979
treaty was an unprecedented step forward for Middle East peace negotiation. Although in some
regards this is an example of the sort of political leadership necessary to forge a regional security
regime for the Middle East, the path to 1979 is different in two important ways. First, both
Egypt and Israel stood to gain much from closer relations with the United States following the
treaty, and secondly, the complexity of a bilateral treaty is hardly comparable to an inclusive
multilateral approach. It would have been impossible in 1979, or at least substantially more
difficult, to pass a treaty including Syria and Iraq, just as today it is an overwhelmingly daunting
task to develop a treaty including Syria and Iran.
Finally, the third possible approach would be facilitated by a network of NGOs. In
similar fashion as the first option, the network could settle on certain guiding principles that
would provide a foundation for an unofficial security regime. The hope driving this sort of
unorthodox proposal is that within most nations of the Middle East, there exist organizations and
parties who have several advantageous characteristics: they have less at stake than governments
when participating in regional dialogue, they have greater credibility than authoritative and often
corrupt governments, and who possess a willingness to engage with their regional counterparts.
In contrast, the last half-century of Middle East relations was dominated by debilitating state
interests and a frequent unwillingness to compromise and engage. The unofficial approach,
although it suffers from a number of possible setbacks of its own sort, would provide a setting
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for the development of new security norms that would provide a framework for building an
official equivalent.
The purpose of this section is to develop a theoretical framework for the effective
operation of a collaborative NGO effort in the Middle East. The section begins by reviewing
different perspectives on the operation and purpose of security regimes. Divided into two broad
categories, examples of security regimes include Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO), the
purpose of which are to create collaborative communities which coordinate efforts on a variety
of policy issues (e.g. NATO, OSCE, etc.), and more restrictive security regimes based on the
enforcement of a single shared policy interest, often relating to arms control or disarmament (e.g.
CWC, BTWC, NPT, SALT). Discussion of the issues surrounding a Track-II security coalition
in the second section will incorporate the substantial body of literature concerning the
development, transmission, and diffusion of security norms. In the third section, I analyze the
educational role of a Track-II security coalition as it pertains to security policy. Much of this
section is concerned with the role of public opinion in the formation and enactment of security
and foreign policy, and so will discuss how the coalition might undertake a moderating role
between publics and governments. As moderators, NGOs can facilitate both the transmission of
public opinion to policymakers and, through educational track II programs, better familiarize
regional publics with complex regional security issues. As much of the existing research
concerning public opinion and security policy is grounded in data from the United States
electorate, and uses voting trends to support its various conclusion, it is an important component
of this section to both attempt to translate some of this work to the conditions observable in the
Middle East, and to propose new areas of quantitative research in the field.
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The following section builds on the theoretic framework presented in Part II to elaborate
on the mechanics, composition, and goals of a proposed track-II security coalition. This section
further develops perspectives on the establishment and growth of a coalition, focusing on the
flexibility and adaptability of the model. There is also a discussion of practical concerns, such as
voting processes, strategies for policy collaboration, and perhaps most importantly, funding.

Security Regimes: Theory and the Middle East
There are a variety of differing perspectives on how security regimes should best
function, and the role they play in international relations. Better understanding security regimes
will allow us to consider the development of a track II coalition that is intended to replicate
certain functions and goals of an official security regime. I include three definitions of security
regime which encapsulate the variety in the field. A traditional definition is provided by Robert
Jervis. A security regime in this view consists of “those principles, rules, and norms that permit
nations to be restrained in behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.”27 This definition
represents the realist perspective on international security by emphasizing balance of power and
the role of competition between states. Building from his definition, Jervis articulates a model
for a security regime, the primary purpose of which is to restrict the behavior of participants.
Later definitions will allow more room for the understanding that security regimes ought to
function as facilitating arrangements for inter-state cooperation. The cooperative perspective is
more applicable to the track II model to be presented later, and should take precedent of Jervis’
realist perspective. The most general and accommodating definition comes from Stephen
Kranser; regimes are “institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which
27
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facilitate a convergence of expectations.”28 This definition is particularly helpful because it
emphasizes the core components of a security regime – norms, rules, and convergence – rather
than tying the definition to a set of activities, institutional structures, or the types of relationships
existing between member states. If there were an opposite perspective to Robert Jervis, it would
be Janne Nolan, who specifically describes the cooperative function of a security regime.
“Cooperative engagement is a strategic principle that seeks to accomplish its purposes through
institutionalized consent rather than through threats of material or physical coercion.”29 Nolan’s
definition of a security regime organized around a cooperative purpose is most appropriate for an
unofficial coalition. In her text, Nolan uses Western Europe to illustrate the ideal operation of a
cooperative organization. Although conditions in the Middle East are significantly more
complex than those in Western Europe, making it difficult to draw useful parallels, cooperation
is the appropriate priority in both regions. Many scholars of Middle East security lean more
towards the realist approach, and in some cases they are right to do so, but only when evaluating
official security regimes in the absence of a track II foundation. For an unofficial coalition,
cooperation and the encouragement of regional diplomacy and the building of political ties
between governments and civil society is of paramount concern.
Regardless of definition, the core of a security regime is a shared set of norms. These can
be norms of military engagement, norms of diplomatic engagement, or social norms. It may be
useful to think of security regimes as institutionalized norms.30 For example, consider the
evolution of the norm against chemical weapons. Chemical weapons have rarely been deployed
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since they were first introduced to the theater of war. These infrequent but devastating instances
most notably include World War I and the Iran-Iraq war.31 Since their invention, the use of
chemicals in warfare was been an international taboo, explaining why so few cases exist in
which they have been deployed. This near universally accepted norm was the foundation for the
CWC, which is a type of security regime relating specifically to arms control.32
The common thread binding all effective security regimes together is the existence of
confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM). As with security regimes, there are
competing definitions of confidence building measures. In a study of Middle East CSBM Yair
Euron provides a definition. “CSBM are measures taken in the strategic-military arena that
regulate the military behavior of states in conflict, leading to the reduction of uncertainty on both
sides in regard to: general military escalation, crisis escalation, surprise attacks, and low-level
violence.”33 This understanding of CSBM emphasizes the role of the military and the transition
from active conflict to detente. Particularly in regard to the Middle East, contributors to the field
tend to favor CSBM that engage militaries in information-sharing, intelligence, crisis simulation,
and joint training exercises. However, once again it is necessary to take a different approach to
confidence building when considering the role of track II projects. A more inclusive perspective
is provided by Michael D. Intriligator. CSBM include “political, economic or other
activities…whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral.”34 This approach is closer to the sense
used in this paper. However, because an unofficial coalition cannot make policy governing
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military, economic or political actions, the arsenal of CSBM is greatly reduced. As is discussed
in the section outlining the structure and composition of the proposed coalition, the primary goal
ought to be the facilitation of regional political engagement. The CSBM employed in the early
stages of regional cooperation should appropriately be limited to dialogue. From this foundation
it will be easier to build more advanced and potentially compromising CSBM in the areas of
military affairs, governance, and economics.
The application of CSBM came into its prime during the détente period of the Cold War
as the United States and the Soviet Union began to negotiate arms limitations and verification
protocol. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, multilateral CSBM were used in Eastern
Europe, and were not limited to the great power arrangements of the Cold War.35 These
activities can be divided into three categories: communication, physical measures, and military
behavior.36 Communication, the most important general category for our consideration, should
itself be broken into two parts. First is the communication between government officials acting
in a diplomatic capacity. By engaging in dialogue, leaders build important relationships with
each other, which help support cooperation and trust between governments. The second part of
communication, which is more common in CSBM literature, encompasses a variety of
information-sharing activities. Returning to the earlier example of U.S.-Soviet arms reduction
agreements, an important component of these sorts of arrangements are verification procedures
that include sharing force posture information, including the number of weapons stockpiled,
delivery systems, etc. The second category, physical measures, includes primarily geographic
concerns. Euron finds the establishment of demilitarized zones as the most common CSBM in
this category. Finally, CSBM in the military behavior category include such things as rules of
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engagement, collective training exercises, and other activities having to do specifically with
interactions between military institutions. Intriligator provides a list of 22 proposals for
confidence building in the Middle East.37 The preponderance of the proposals draw from prior
efforts in the region relating to weapons technology, delivery systems, communications, warning
and surprise attack procedures, accidental or inadvertent war, and both legal and illegal arms
shipments. These CSBM are divided into three phases for implementation, and despite being
nearly two decades old, many are still relevant and worthy of consideration.
Related to the types of CSBM incorporated into security regimes, Steven Spiegel
provides a useful breakdown of the different operating levels of a security regime.38 Spiegel
considers three distinct levels: systemic, domestic, and individual. The systemic level describes
the way states interact as part of a network of competing interests. The systemic relationships
between states influence their behavior in pursuit of their interests, while also in some cases
redefining states interests. The name of the next layer of interaction, the domestic level, is
somewhat misleading. In his analysis of these interactions, Spiegel is concerned with
interactions between bureaucracies, and the socializing effect these interactions can have. The
domestic layer does not pertain to influences from the public. The domestic layer is at the heart
of norm transference, one of the primary effects of participation in a security regime. The
individual level encompasses interactions between political leadership. The socializing effect of
these interactions is similar to the domestic level interactions. However, it is worth
differentiating between bureaucrats and political elites because the socializing effect manifests
differently on the two levels. On the domestic level, collaboration between government
departments will influence the perspectives represented in the policy production process, and
37
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gradually bring the two governments nearer to consensus by adhering to certain norms. On the
individual level, the important effect is the development of relationships between heads of state
and other political elites. These relationships make leaders more inclined to cooperate with each
other and increase the likelihood of further integration and cooperation. Beyond the three levels
presented by Spiegel, it is necessary to include the public as a fourth. The reason this fourth
layer is not already a standard component of security regime studies is the absence of
institutionalized interactions between publics and governments in the context of existing security
regimes; i.e. security regimes are the domain of government elites, and publics are only relevant
to the extent they influence particular government members of a regime. The fourth layer is
important to consider insofar as publics influence the behavior of their governments, a subject
discussed at length in a later section. The influence of the public will be doubly important in the
modeling of an unofficial coalition. One of the key roles of NGOs in security policy is to
interact with the public, both to educate the public, and to advocate for public interest in their
interactions with the government.
Returning now to security regimes, there are a number of ways to differentiate the
various types of security regimes. Evron uses five categories in his analysis, ranging from the
weakest integrated models, to the strongest, with the primary variances being the number of
states involved and the number of agreed upon CSBM. Weakest in the list are security
conventions. These regimes are informal arrangements (i.e. they are not organized around a
codified treaty that articulates the goals and understandings of the parties involved) between
states that do not maintain diplomatic relations. The primary enforcement mechanism here is
unilateral deterrence. Qualified regimes are next, with either unilateral or mutual deterrence, and
a complex network of CSBM. Third are normal security regimes. These arrangements are based
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on formal diplomatic relations between participants, and are also grounded in a network of
CSBM. Common security regimes are similar to normal regimes, except the former includes
multilateral arrangements (recall the CWC example) and are characterized by a greater degree of
cooperation between participants. At the top end of the spectrum, cooperative security regimes
maintain a very high level of cooperation between participants and adhere to a robust and
penetrating set of CSBM.
In contrast to Evron, I choose to organize my consideration of security regimes around
function, rather than the degree of integration. With Evron’s approach, there is no end to the
variances between the degrees of integration as you compare regions and historical periods, so
the distinctions used by Evron are not particularly informative when trying to understand and
contrast existing regimes. Furthermore, my approach is different because it does not offer a
consideration of the fundamentally weak and almost non-existent regimes on the lower end of
the integration scale. However, it is worth noting that the preponderance of security regimes that
have existed in the Middle East since the mid-twentieth century have been of this sort: weak,
bilateral, and short-lived.39
It is more useful to think about security regimes in four categories: legal, restrictive,
cooperative, and allied. Within each category it should be understood that different regimes will
maintain varying degrees of participant integration and cooperation. Legal regimes are those
without a strong central organization to facilitate regime activities and dialogue. The best
examples are weapon of mass destruction free zones (WMDFZ), such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Bangkok Treaty, and the Pelindaba Treaty, each of which are
39
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specifically regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones. There are also treaties banning the
militarization of Antarctica, the seabed, and space. These treaties typically represent the
codification of existing international security norms, and do not pertain directly to the settlement
of a specific conflict. The CSBM included in legal regimes are verification measures agreed
upon by regime members that enable them to confirm adherence to the norms established by the
regime.
Restrictive regimes rely primarily on CSBM that involve military coordination. These
are regimes discussed earlier in the realist model by Robert Jervis; the regime exists in a state of
conflict, and the measures imposed by the regime are intended to restrict the behavior of its
members in the mutually acknowledged interest of preventing future military conflict. Third,
cooperative regimes are organized around cooperative principles. These regimes are not the
byproduct of active conflict in the way of realist regimes. Cooperative organizations rely
primarily on political coordination between governments to address regional issues. These
regimes are likely to evolve out of the success of restrictive regimes, and so will maintain certain
military CSBM. Examples of cooperative regimes include the OSCE and ASEAN. Lastly, the
most integrated form of security regimes are those between allied countries. These regimes
include collective security arrangements in addition to highly integrated CSBM, including shared
military training exercises and shared technology. The most familiar example of this sort of
arrangement is NATO.
As noted earlier, the Middle East has a history of short-lived, weak security regimes. The
preponderance of these regimes were restrictive, as they were established in the wake of active
military conflicts and were limited to military CSBM. However, founded in May 1981, the
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Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) is a reasonably successful example
of a cooperative regime. Consider the following description of the GCC goals:
The GCC Charter states that the basic objectives are to effect coordination,
integration and inter-connection between Member States in all fields,
strengthening ties between their peoples, formulating similar regulations in
various fields such as economy, finance, trade, customs, tourism, legislation,
administration, as well as fostering scientific and technical progress in industry,
mining, agriculture, water and animal resources, establishing scientific research
centers, setting up joint ventures, and encouraging cooperation of the private
sector.40

As a cooperative security regime, the focus of the GCC is on economic integration,
scientific collaboration, social programs, and other non-military issues. In the study of Middle
Eastern security, the GCC is a useful example of how to build a successful regime, either through
a regional structure, or as a network of sub-regional regimes including, and modeled after, the
GCC. The obstacle faced by these proposals, which is often not addressed, is the differences in
composition between either regional or sub-regional organizations. The GCC, compared the rest
of the Middle East, is relatively homogeneous. Its membership includes the United Arab
Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar,
and Kuwait. Note that Yemen is not included among the membership, thus explaining the
survival of the regime through intermittent diplomatic and military confrontations between Saudi
Arabia and Yemen. A credible regional regime would require the membership of Israel, Syria,
Iran, and Egypt (the participation of other states in the region is less controversial outside this
central group). Likewise, a network of sub-regional regimes would require the participation of
Yemen in the GCC, the inclusion of Israel in a Levantine organization, and participation from
peripheral states such as Iran either as an independent state or a member of a regional group in
40
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West Asia. With either approach, inclusivity is a problem, and the model and precedent
established by the GCC is unhelpful.
Security regimes face three types of problems, mostly having to do with the development
stages, the most concerning of which is political instability. When entering into a security
arrangement, a government will be less likely to accept a partnership that includes governments
facing intense domestic opposition or which display instability within the regime. Spiegel’s41
work identified both Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadaffi as examples of unstable regimes
which would make poor regime participants. In both cases, the elite political leadership
appeared too far removed from the public to make them credible partners in a long term security
arrangement. It goes without saying that Spiegel’s choice of examples turned out to be
particularly poignant. A second problem security regimes are prone to facing are dramatic shifts
in economic conditions, both regionally, and when isolated in single member states. This is
similar to political issues because poor economic conditions can result in public unrest and
dissatisfaction with the government. However, in the case of public unrest resulting from an
economic downturn, the onset of these conditions can be rapid and are usually unpredictable, and
can destabilize an already establish regime.42 Finally, and of particular relevance to the Middle
East, the balance of power between non-member states and member states in a region can
influence the integrity of a security regime. In the context of the Middle East, this problem
would likely arise if a regime were established that was not inclusive. For instance, if a security
regime were created among exclusively Arab states, the divisions in the region would be
exacerbated depending on Israel’s perception of the new Arab organization. In this instance, the
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creation of a security regime would effectively worsen the security relations in the region, rather
than improve them. The same argument can be made for including Iran in a security regime. In
the Middle East, the threat of an arms race in response to a poorly considered security regime is
very real, and should be deterrent enough to prevent the creation of a regime that lacks regional
universality.

Security Norms
A norm is a standard of behavior that governs a group of actors of a particular, unifying
identity.43 These standards of behavior exist as networks of inter-subjective understandings
between actors. Academic discourse on norms span both political science and sociology, where
political scientists typically emphasize the role of international norms in political society, and
sociologists examine the role of social norms in everyday life. Among political scientists,
liberals, constructivists, rationalists, and realists maintain four distinct perspectives on norm
theory.44 In brief, the liberal perspective describes norms as providing incentives for social
actors and political leadership to behave in a particular manner. In this way, norms constrain
behavior. Constructivists believe that norms are learned by elites through interaction, and to that
extent, they are shared understandings that constitute actor identities. The rationalist perspective
differs in the provided understanding of norm propagation. Political elites decide to adhere to
norms because of strategic interests. By understanding the process of norm propagation in this
way, the realist perspective runs against a theory of norms where they spread by learning, or
43
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where they constrain behaviors. Lastly, the realist perspective denies the existence of norms.
Instead, realists describe larger behavioral trends with micro-level strategic calculations, where a
belief in norms is an abstraction and should instead be considered as a network of interacting,
independent choices. Understanding norms is useful when evaluating political behavior and
social organization, and for the purposes of this paper, are particularly relevant to understanding
how certain beliefs and behaviors can become standardized throughout a region.
Given that the primary focus of this paper is security policy in the Middle East, the reader
should assume that unless otherwise stated, the norms under consideration are security norms.
Furthermore, for the purposes of this paper, norms should be thought of as operating on two
distinct but related levels. First, norms exist between states. These can be codified legal norms
or norms that have developed through a history of state behavior and interaction. These sorts of
international norms traditionally include rules of engagement in military conflict, diplomatic
norms for interacting with foreign governments, behavior in international waters, the
understanding of sovereignty and sovereign rights, etc. The second sort of norms are those
among publics. As it pertains to security policy, these norms can be difficult to evaluate,
primarily because the polity is a complex organization, and often cannot be discussed effectively
as a unified whole. For this reason, norms existing on the national level ought to be considered
in parts: elites, the attentive public, and the mass public. This division is particularly useful in
the discussion of the transfer of norms between states and the diffusion of norms within states.
When studying the influence of norms, it is helpful to recognize that norms cannot be
“bad” from the frame of reference of an adherent to a given norm.45 It is possible, from the
perspective of an outsider, to make normative claims about the appropriateness or effectiveness
45
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of a given observable norm, but this sort of commentary is not helpful in understanding the
character of a norm. A norm is a way of behaving, both among states and among individuals.
Unlike a law or rule, a norm is not something that needs to be referenced to be understood by an
adherent, but instead is accepted as a natural or given standard of behaving. More difficult to
evaluate is the way in which this sort of standard is passed along. Although norms have a sense
about them of being natural, they are clearly not. Instead they evolve through a socializing
process which unlike with established norms, can involve a normative judgment from potential
adherents.
Although there is a substantial body of work concerning the existence of norms,
especially regarding their influence on international politics, considerably less has been said
about the development of norms and how they are propagated. In this work, I lean heavily on the
analysis presented by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in their 1998 collaboration,
“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”46 Of particular relevance, their work
outlines a “lifecycle” of norm development.47 This lifecycle exists in four stages: norm
emergence, realignment, norm cascade, and internalization. Three stages are from Finnemore
and Sikkink, but in order to more effectively accommodate the Middle East, I include
“realignment” as a separate second stage.
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Figure 3: the processes involved in norm
diffusion

Figure three provides a useful reference in understanding the process of norm diffusion.
The process it depicts will become clearer in the following pages. In summary, part “A”
identifies the beginning of the process at the norm entrepreneur, identified in the diagram by a
red dot. Part “B” is the process throughout which norms are spread between publics through
social institutions, and in the case presented in this paper, through NGO engagement projects.
Part “C” depicts the spreading of a norm from some segment of society, perhaps a social or
economic elite, to government elites. Part “D” shows the process of norm diffusion through
government interaction, a process also facilitated by NGO projects. Finally, part “E” shows the
cascade of norms to other regional states after a critical mass of influential states is achieved.
The most important actor in the norm emergence stage is the entrepreneur. Although the
originator of a particular norm could be thought of as a state, I restrict this part of the process to
individuals.48 Restricting discussion of norm entrepreneurs to individuals will assist the coming
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discussion of the Track-II security coalition and the role played by diplomats, bureaucrats,
academics, analysts, and others participating in dialogue with foreign counterparts. Norm
entrepreneurs identify specific concerns about an existing way of behaving. Norm entrepreneurs
typically have an organizational foundation, are characterized by altruism, empathy, idealism and
commitment, and use persuasion to propagate their ideas.49 Finnemore and Sikkink specifically
identify issues of human agency, indeterminacy, chance occurrences, and favorable events as the
origins for most norms.50 Issues identified at this stage in the formation of security norms
involves a specific government practice or policy that develops within the context of the
necessary originating conditions. In order for changes on this micro-level to develop into a new
norm, the policy in question must be part of a broader network of similar policies. The reform of
the parts can potentially lead to a change in norms.
Part of the role of a norm entrepreneur is to position an issue such that it is translatable to
other individuals and states. David Snow refers to this process as “frame alignment.” Much of
this process has to do with the language used to describe an issue. By creating particular
meaningful associations with an issue, the norm entrepreneur creates frames which organize
collective experiences and influence the actions of potential norm adherents.51
The organizational platform of the entrepreneur is particularly important as an
educational tool. NGOs and IGOs rely heavily on individual expertise and educational programs
to influence policy and behavior.52 Education is of particular importance to the operation of the
security coalition. Educational programs and the use of experts to support the propagation of

49

Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 p.898
Ibid p.895
51
Snow, David A., R. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. “Frame Alignment
Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” American Sociological Review 51: 464-481.p464
52
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 p899
50

43 Stewart-Smith

norms nationally and internationally. In this sense, education is used to socialize participants to
the new way of behaving. Perhaps the best observable instances of this function of NGOs is
among international advocacy organizations. In particular, consider Greenpeace and Amnesty
International. Greenpeace USA recently launched their “how clean is your cloud” campaign, an
effort to influence Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon to advance their use of clean energy to support
the operations of their data clouds.53 This particular campaign is part of a broader Greenpeace
campaign for renewable energy, an advocacy operation that, along with other similar
organizations, has successfully influenced the framing of the energy debate, and to that end, the
norms of behavior for a substantial portion of society. Amnesty International maintains offices
in more than 80 countries and works to promote the respect of human rights as a norm of
behavior.54 Much of their work is done through advocacy programs and digital campaigning.
Amnesty International is a product of one of the most successful contemporary framing efforts;
the categorization of certain rights as “fundamental,” “unalienable,” or “human”, frames certain
behavior negatively and has thereby produced a new canon, both international and domestic (the
most obvious being the International Declaration of Human Rights). Through their educational
activities, Amnesty International extends and reinforces human rights norms.
Education can also have the opposite effect. It stands to reason that if the dissemination
of information can bolster the creation of a norm, it can also present a hindrance. Finnemore and
Sikkink specifically reference national government and IGO training programs which resist
spreading norms. Resistance is not necessarily explicit; that is, the spreading norm is not
identified specifically. Instead, resistance is a product of competing ideologies, behaviors, or
frames of reference.
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Finally, emerging norms are sometimes supported by institutionalization. Recall I
suggested that norms should be thought of as distinct from laws. While this is the case for truly
ubiquitous norms, an important strategy in norm propagation is the use of laws to reframe and
standardize a given set of behaviors. For a domestic example of this strategy, consider President
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, or later, the order by Federal Judge Robert Mehrige in
1971 to begin busing students as an anti-segregation measure.55 Both of these cases exemplify
the use of legal authority to lend enhanced legitimacy to an issue and enforce an already
expanding norm. As for international law, perhaps the best examples come from arms control
regimes. In a particularly poignant example from Finnemore and Sikkink, the institutionalization
of the prohibitions on the use of chemical weapons, in the form of the CWC, helped gain support
for sanctions against Iraq during the First Gulf War.
Around this point in the “lifecycle” of a norm, when the number of adherents has grown
significantly enough from the initiating entrepreneur, the norm approaches a tipping point. For
Finnemore and Sikkink, the tipping point is the division between stage one and the cascade of
stage two. However, in discussing the Middle East, it is necessary to consider realignment as an
intermediate step. Also, recognize that while the first stage was discussed in terms of individual
interactions and behavior, it is assumed in the transition to the second stage that the emerging
norm has taken hold in the originating state (or coalition of states) and through interactions with
representatives of other states, is already spreading to neighbors and regional partners. This
implies that a tipping point has already been reached on a domestic level in at least one country,
and that step two progresses primarily in the spread of norms between governments and social
elites, and the conflicts between standing norms and the emerging norm. The Middle East, for a
55

The Virginia Historical Society. “The Civil Rights Movement in Virginia”
http://www.vahistorical.org/civilrights/busing.htm last accessed April 18, 2012

45 Stewart-Smith

number of historical reasons, is a nexus of both competing norms, and competing effects or
interpretations of norms, both between states and between segments of civil society. The former
of the two conditions is most famously exemplified by the regional unrest surrounding the Camp
David Accords and the official peace treaty between Egypt and Israel enacted the following year.
In this instance, the Egyptian government was in a state of transition between two competing
norms. The dominant regional norm at the time with regard to diplomatic behavior was
decidedly anti-Israeli among Arab states. The competing extra-regional norm, to which the
primary adherents were the United States and Western Europe, was supportive in their relations
with Israel. In this case, norm realignment was isolated in Egypt, but it had the regional effect of
upsetting the balance of power, or more appropriately prestige, among Arab States.
Here is where my model diverges from the traditional canon of norms research in
political science and international relations. In analyzing the norm lifecycle, there ought to be
two distinct levels of engagement under consideration. First is the traditional approach which
explains the creation of international norms in terms of government reactions to changing state
interests and regional dynamics. The second level, which is more important to the discussion of
the Middle East, is the spread of norms through international civil society, and the effect of that
spread on government behavior as civil society and governments collaborate on regional issues.
In many cases, the civil society component may be negligible. However, cases in which state
norms as embodied by government behavior are well entrenched in a given region, the behavior
and flexibility of civil society must be considered. As a norm gains domestic momentum, in
certain cases the transition of a norm from a domestic to an international arena will occur. This
will happen first through civil society activities where norm identities will differ between civil
society and government. Over time, realignment occurs as the behavior of governments shift to
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overlay with civil society; this is the operating theory upon which the notion of a track-II security
coalition is founded.
Few cases exist in which regions have moved from a state of conflict to the establishment
of a regional security regime, and none exist in which the transition entails so dramatic a shift in
state behaviors as it does in the Middle East. The origin of the idea is the scholarship that
evaluates the goals of NGOs operating in the Middle East, and their effectiveness in pursuing
their goals.56 A common theme in much of this work is the importance of creating new security
norms, or depending on the author, a new security culture. Regardless the intent is the same. In
none of these publications is there discussion of something akin to the analysis present in the
literature concerning norms, so very little attention is given to the process of creating norms.
The stated objective in many cases is the creation of a security regime in the region, the purpose
of which is to propagate more cooperative security norms.57 Although in some cases this
approach has been effective, the Middle East requires the reverse because current state
behavioral norms are set firmly against a regionally inclusive security regime (i.e. a security
regime that includes Israel). The activities of NGOs operating in the Middle East, both
regionally based and with extra regional origins, clearly display a willingness in some sectors of
civil society to pursue regional relationships and collaborative efforts that are unfathomable
among regional governments. This is the foundation for stage two realignment and the transition
from a domestic norm to a regional norm.
In discussing stage three, we have transitioned to state-state interactions as the primary
area of concern. Although interactions between domestic actors are still an important component
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to norm creation on an international level, it is important to emphasize factors relating
specifically to state behavior in norm creation. Finnemore and Sikkink rely heavily on the
explanatory power of state prestige in the spread of norms between states.58 They theorize that it
takes roughly a third of states in a given region before a cascade will be possible. After a
“critical mass” of states is achieved, states outside the emerging norm will be inclined to adopt a
norm in order to avoid being pushed to the periphery of regional politics. It is important here to
recognize the composition of a critical mass will vary depending on the influence of individual
states. In the Middle East for instance, Israel, Egypt, and Syria as members of a coalition will
carry substantially more influence than Yemen or Qatar. The concept of critical mass leading to
a cascade of new norm adherents in the Middle East is further complicated by the issues
discussed under stage two. It cannot be assumed that state interests, especially not prestige, will
be compelling enough forces to drive a norm towards regional universality. Iran, for example,
would not be compelled to adhere to a norm of regional cooperation under the status quo, even if
a coalition of cooperative states were already emerging, because opposition to Israel and their
allies is a more fruitful source of state prestige in the region. However, if stage two is successful,
regional resistance may be significantly enough reduced to reach Finnemore and Sikkink’s
tipping point.
In discussing the spread of norms among individuals, it is common to frame norm
diffusion as a sort of contagion. Besides framing understanding as a pejorative, in the case of
international norms, and based on our understanding of state behavior, it is more accurate to
think of norm transmission as a deliberative function.59 Just as states may be compelled to
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adhere to a norm because of certain state interests, states already conforming to a new norm will
be inclined to impress upon their neighbors the value of conformity.
The fourth and final stage of norm development is the internalization of the new norm.
In this stage the emerging norm becomes a default behavior, a natural recourse that is not
disputed. It is at this stage of norm development when a norm becomes difficult to identify, and
therefore difficult to study. The behavior engendered by the standard of the norm becomes
ubiquitous, and so indistinguishable. In political science, established norms are not of prominent
concern because they are not contentious, and are often ignored by popular political debate
(instead, norms provide the common ground in political debate, they frame the political reality
for discourse). For an analysis of existing norms, the institutionalists of sociology are helpful for
their “denaturalizing” of certain existing norms, such as sovereignty, individualism, and certain
characteristics of the market.60 This particular area of norms research is of less importance to
our discussion of the track-II security coalition, because norms are much more contentious and
easier to identify in the emerging three stages of the norm lifecycle, and these three stages are the
primary concern of the coalition. However, further research in the influence and development of
existing social and security norms in the Middle East would be valuable. The research concerns
primarily Western states and identifies a significant degree of similarity between states, and ties
these similarities to past norm cascades. Understanding similar relationships would be useful.
The four stages of norm development accommodate both spreading norms between
individuals and states, where interactions between civil society institutions and governments of
different states help to establish the emerging norm. After a norm is established in one or more
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states, there are a number of ways to explain the greater diffusion of norms. While prestige is
not particularly helpful in the discussion norm universality in the Middle East, there are a
number of processes through which the diffusion of norms might occur as part of a deliberate
government or civil effort. Jeffery Checkel provides a vision of these mechanisms that overlay
well with norm diffusion in the Middle East.61 Although Checkel’s work referenced here
specifically addresses the spread of already established international norms into domestic
politics, and does not address the evolution of new norms, his attention to civil society and
education in norm diffusion will be important to understand for a track-II security coalition. In
Checkel’s approach, norms can be both constraining and constitutive; i.e. the values inherent in
an established norm may not be adopted by elites, but the broader acceptance of the norm forces
some degree of adherence, as opposed to a norm that exists as a shared understanding or identity
and constitutes a deeper connection between adherents. Either way a norm is manifest, the
process through which a norm enters domestic politics is called “empowerment.” This occurs in
two possible ways, the first of which is similar to the second stage process of realignment
previously described. Checkel articulates a constraining norm that spreads through advocacy by
civil-society institutions and their interactions with governments. Elites do not adopt the norm,
but their behavior is nonetheless constrained by its proliferation. The second mechanism of
norm diffusion is through the occurrence of learning and socialization between interacting elites.
Here, norms are learned and internalized in a constitutive process.
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Checkel uses a coding process to evaluate the different ways norms spread between
states. He applies this approach to some members of the Council of Europe (COE).62 Four
categorizations of states are used in Checkel’s approach: liberal, corporatist, statist, and stateabove-society. For each category, he identifies which actors will be most influential in the
diffusion of norms.63 In liberal societies the dominant force, and the only one considered, is
societal pressure on governing elites. In a corporatist structure, the primary influence is social
pressure and a secondary factor is participation from elites. The reverse is true in statist
structures, where elite learning is dominant and social pressure is secondary. Lastly, in the
authoritarian state-above-society structure, the only factor at work is elite learning. It is worth
noting that Checkel deliberately leaves out coercion from his analysis, whereby powerful states
pressure their weaker counterparts to adhere to certain behavioral standards. This omission is
explained by his intention to present a causal account of norms influencing international politics
by synthesizing two previously disparate theoretical perspectives. Because coercion is part of
the realist explanation for how norms are perceived and therefore is fundamentally at odds with
the existence of norms in international politics, it cannot be usefully incorporated in the same
theoretical framework.
Checkel uses the successes of the COE to explain the appropriateness of his
categorizations. The COE represents a reasonable catalyst for the subject of norms diffusion for
multiple reasons. As an international regime, it consists of a variety of states from each segment
of Checkel’s spectrum of state organization. Furthermore, among international organizations,
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the COE is considered one of the most effective collaborative bodies.64 Finally, as an advocate
for the European human rights regime, the COE has proved a successful device for spreading
humanitarian norms, specifically citizenship and minority rights. Checkel selected four states for
his analysis: Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and Great Britain, which are categorized as state-abovesociety, statist, corporatist, and liberal respectively. The challenge of this sort of analysis is to
both prove the existence of a norm, and the absence or contested status of the same norm in the
domestic arenas being evaluated. In order to achieve this, Checkel relied both on careful
readings of relevant European treaties a series of interviews with bureaucrats and politicians
involved in national implementation of the treaties being considered.65
Civil society groups operating in Ukraine are predominantly small and almost entirely
ignored by the government, hence the importance of elite education for norm diffusion. The
successful advance of citizenship rights in Ukraine is explained through the interactions between
Ukrainian elites in the 1993 Interdepartmental Commission for Questions of Ukraine’s
Admission to the Council of Europe. The integration and learning from the admission process
enabled the diffusion of norms to the political elite in Ukraine, despite the absence of effective
social pressures. Like Ukraine, elite learning in Russia was facilitated by groups of government
elites whose responsibility it was to interact with their COE counterparts. In this case two bodies
were established. The first, the 1992 Citizenship Commission, was attached to the President’s
office, and the second, the Directorate for Pan-European Cooperation, was part of the Foreign
Ministry. Although elite education was the primary mechanism of diffusion at work, the
Moscow School of Political Studies, although its actions are restricted by the Foreign Ministry, is
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part of an extensive network which was able to apply limited societal pressure on the
government. In Germany, the empowerment process was much more complicated and involved
considerably more civil society participants. The best example of societal pressure came in the
form of a petitioning effort, begun in 1992, which gathered over a million signatures. There
were also COE forums which helped to propagate citizenship norms among the public. As a
secondary influence, Checkel identifies political leaders who became advocates for the new
citizenship norms, but whose input was less influential than the petitioning project. Lastly, the
liberal structure of Great Britain enables substantial influence to flow from social pressures. In a
number of COE-related areas, including citizenship, domestic institutions in Britain have
appealed to the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights in order to pressure
British government.
Checkel’s framework is helpful in organizing one’s thoughts about norm diffusion in a
given region, but it is lacking in three particular ways. First, the categorization is an artificial
process and inherently limits the ability to evaluate differences within categories and confines
the understanding of subject states. Although the model appears to fit well with the four
European states, it may be less instructive if each category were illustrated with more than a
single state. Differences among states within categories shows variances that exist between
similarly structured societies and thus presents problems with Checkel’s model. Secondly,
Checkel’s model does not account for changes in state behavior as the diffusion process
progresses. The most evident example of this shortcoming in the Middle East is the shift in
conditions in Egypt since early 2011. Under the Mubarak government, Egypt would likely be
considered state-above-society (although a case could be made for statist as well). Today,
shifting power structures make it difficult to decisively say which category Egypt should fall
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into, let alone how particular actors, such as the Military Council, are likely to interact with civil
organizations. Admittedly, Checkel’s model is clearly designed for retrospective analysis, so
shifting conditions and the convolution of current events were not problematic in considering
European citizenship norms (although he acknowledges a predictive component to his analysis of
the diffusion to Great Britain).66 Finally, the four categories, each with varying degrees of social
pressure and elite learning acting as the mechanisms of diffusion, does not account for external
pressures from foreign governments or civil institutions. To the extent that foreign actors are
considered, it is as part of the learning process of elites, whereby norms are internalized. In the
Middle East is necessary to consider the influence of state and civil society pressures from
outside the domestic arena. For instance, the decision-making calculus for Lebanon will vary
between instances in which it is acting with relative independence, and when it is acting as part
of a coalition of regional partners. The analysis of citizenship advocacy in Britain included
discussion of external pressure, but this should not be isolated in the Liberal category of state
organization.
Like Checkel, I do not believe it is useful, let alone accurate, to disallow the simultaneous
consideration of both constitutive and constraining theories of norm diffusion, operating on
differing levels and between different institutions, but within the same society. Depending on
the actors and circumstances, either process may be extant. However, I move a step further by
allowing for both constitutive and constraining effects in either of the two diffusion processes,
because in some ways the distinction between the two is artificial. I propose, as part of the
realignment process, that norms will be learned by government elites not only by interacting with
other government elites, but through the instruction, example, and cooperation with civil society
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institutions. Through this unified process, it seems inevitable that some portion of elites will
fully internalize the norm, whereas others, influenced both by civil society and their foreign and
domestic elite counterparts, will be constrained.
The role of track two projects, as envisioned in this paper, is to enable the process of
norm diffusion. By creating previously nonexistent links within and between communities in the
Middle East, the track II coalition would stand to move regional integration, and the prerequisite
peace negotiations and disarmament treaties, further than regional precedent. Although the early
stages of creating the coalition are a concrete, short-term option for advancing Middle East
relations, it must be understood that norm diffusion, as a catalyst for improved relations, may
take many years. With this broad view of norm diffusion, it is now necessary to narrow our
focus to a consideration of half the norm diffusion equation; the relationship between publics and
their governments.

Public Opinion, Education, and Security Policy
In providing a review and analysis of public opinion literature, this section serves two
important purposes. To begin, a better understanding of public opinion helps to elucidate the
process of norm diffusion between a given public and their government. In the terms presented
in this section, this process is primarily embodied by the various means of public expression, and
how opinion can be measured, evaluated, and presented to governors. Additionally, and more
practically, the presented literature (and accompanying critique) helps to explain how a track two
coalition can work to avoid the sort of media backlash and public opposition which has dashed
many previous projects. This process is the reverse of the former, in that it outlines how track II
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projects can undertake educational and public engagement programs to help create media
diversity and ideally, a better informed public.
Recalling the review of NGO projects in the Middle East, and the importance of
interacting effectively with the public during the filtering process, the following section analyzes
perspectives on the interaction between public opinion and security policy. Most of the work in
this field uses data based on voting records, polling, and corresponding relationship to policy
implementation. Nearly all of this work uses data from the United States, and much of it
concerns public opinion about either the advancement or elimination of nuclear weapons.
Although the contributors to this field are many, the limited scope of the existing research
presents some problems as we turn towards the Middle East. The most immediate concern is the
lack of accurate polling in the Middle East on foreign policy and security issues. In the absence
of this sort of data it is difficult to reasonably translate the lessons of Western studies to the
existing circumstances in the Middle East (reminiscent of the problems faced by Checkel in his
COE case study). Therefore, much of this section will address broader theories of social
influence and synthesize a basic theoretical framework for considering the role of public opinion
in the Middle East.
Over the last century, two schools of thought have emerged in the study of how public
opinion influences the state: the traditionalists and the revisionists. The former generally
believing the public to be incapable of developing accurate opinions on security and foreign
policy issues, whereas the latter presents a variety of perspectives explaining how the public can,
under certain conditions, make positive contributions to foreign policy. In 1925, Walter
Lippmann published one of the first and most widely known traditionalist perspectives, in which
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he famously referred to political leadership being “trampled by the bewildered herd.”67
Following Lippmann came a long line of scholarship, although many of the most notable
traditionalists did not come to fore until the 1950s and 1960s.68 In their analysis of the field,
Hank Jenkins-Smith and Kerry Herron identify three traits of the traditionalist perspective. First,
mass publics generally lack the sophistication and educational background to contribute to policy
discussions that involve complex ideological perspectives and technical comprehension. Second,
traditionalists rely on empirical evidence suggesting that average citizens lack belief systems that
can produce useful opinions in the absence of sufficient knowledge. Finally, the mass public
lacks the means to analyze and understand complex issues. Herron and Jenkins-Smith
characterize the adherents to traditionalism as “political sophisticates, theorists, and academics”
who came to guide the generally accepted understanding of public opinion.
To represent the traditionalist perspective, I use the 1956 analysis from Gabriel Almond,
and the 1968 work by James Rosenau. Almond begins by dividing society into five components:
government, media, interest groups, the attentive public, and the mass public. The nature of the
division between publics is our foremost concern. With regard to the mass public, Almond
points out that the development of security policy, by its nature, is a secretive process. The
limits placed on information diffusion in security policy prevent the mass public from
developing accurate opinions. Furthermore, Almond supposed that the stakes in discussions of
security policy, as opposed to domestic policy, are often so great and abstract to the average
member of the mass public that they become effectively meaningless. The primary means of
obtaining information in the mass public is from the mass media, which is itself subject to
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skewed and incomplete information. In the absence of knowledge, Almond suggested that the
mass public responds in “moods” to the stories they are exposed to through the media. Rather
than using the media to form an accurate, informed opinion, the mass public uses media inputs to
decide how they ought to feel on a given issue. The central notion in dividing the capacities of
the two publics to engage in policy could be thought of as information asymmetry; this is the
common thread running through traditionalist theories of public opinion. The ignorance and
irrational tendencies of the mass public are balanced somewhat by the much smaller, but still
influential, attentive public. The composition of the attentive public falls somewhere between
policymakers, academics, influential elites, and the mass public. These are the members of
society who make it their business to be informed about security policy. They form reasoned
opinions and provide a stabilizing force in the arena of public discourse.
In a transition spanning the last three or four decades, the traditionalists have largely been
replaced by revisionist theories. The guiding principles of the traditionalist paradigm were
increasingly viewed as prohibitively pessimistic concerning the cognitive competency of the
general public. Among the most compelling early revisionist publications came in the 1970s and
called into question the methodology of the prominent traditionalist scholars.69 These early
critiques focused primarily on the structure and implementation of survey projects used to
portray the mass public as ignorant and capricious. A common flaw in these surveys was a
failure to recognize and minimize instances of question bias. The emphasis of the traditionalist
perspective on the acquisition of raw information in the decision making process, resulted in a
heavy emphasis on survey questions requiring subject-specific knowledge. In the revisionist
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view, the absence of advanced academic work or policy experience in the security field should
not be considered prerequisite to the formation of relevant opinion amongst the general public.
Two prominent publications in the 1980s advanced the revisionist claim that although survey
data can be interpreted to show a divide between the opinions of the mass public and elites, the
conclusion should not be that the mass public is incorrect.70 A more recent study from the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) reinforced the conclusions of earlier works with a
data set spanning nearly a decade. The CCFR publication acknowledges gaps between public
opinion and elites, but where traditionalist literature attributes these gaps to the ignorance of the
public and the comparative wisdom of elites, the gaps are now explained by analyzing disparities
between the values, goals, and interests of the two groups.71
The most important facet to the revisionist perspective is the understanding that members
of the public need not have all the facts on a given policy in order to have a relevant opinion. 72
Although a certain amount of information is necessary to make an informed decision, Lupia and
McCubbins present an analysis that highlights the ability of individuals to discern which
information is most useful when it is presented to them. They place value on the ability to ignore
or forget information. Rather than being able articulate a thoughtful opinion on the more
nuanced aspects of security policy, it is more important that a member of the public be able to
understand the likely consequences of a policy as they apply to their interests. By distinguishing
between the sort of decision burden elites face, and the lesser burden of the public, it becomes
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less important that the two groups demonstrate equal subject knowledge. Extending upon these
differing standards, it is helpful to consider James Surowiecki’s work on collective judgments,
and his four part characterization of a “wise” public.73 First is information diversity, which
requires that public beliefs be grounded in at least some fundamental understanding of all
relevant issue factors, including a basic technical understanding. The second category,
independence, requires that individuals are not pressured to conform to a particular belief. Third,
decentralization requires that individuals be able to consider local and personal experiences.
Finally, aggregation accounts for the importance of being able to synthesize policies or
collective decisions using the assorted individual judgments. Surowiecki’s analysis is more
restrictive than most revisionists, indeed its emphasis on information diversity seems to draw
from the traditionalist perspective, but the purpose of the four categories is different from most
revisionist projects. In Surowiecki’s text the four categories are discussed in terms of
“correctness” rather than simply appropriateness or legitimacy as you might find in similar
publications. The four categories describe the conditions that must be met in order for the mass
public to produce an actionable policy, whereas revisionists like Page and Barabas from the
CCFR project focused on the ability of individuals to make judgments based on their own
distinct values and goals, rather than those of the state more generally.
In their 2006 publication, Herron and Jenkins-Smith provide a summary of the five
axioms of revisionist theory. The first axiom is a point we have already discussed; a complete
knowledge set is not a prerequisite for making valuable policy choices. Belief systems (such as
liberalism, realism, or rationalism) serve to both support and constrain mass publics in the same
way elite discourse relies on them to provide coherence and consistency, but a nuanced
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understanding of them is not required. Short term variances in mass opinion should not be taken
as changes in preferences because long-term data shows a greater degree of consistency. In the
short run, while members of the mass public may use belief systems and heuristics adopted from
elite policy debates, data shows that over the long run public beliefs influence government
behavior. Finally, although it can be demonstrated that the mass public relies heavily on
personal values, goals, and interests, it should not be assumed that the public is incapable of
appreciating certain general public interests. Although this system of axioms is drawn from
studies using mostly the American public, many of the general conclusions can be applied to our
study of the Middle East, and will inform to the structure and operations of a track-II coalition
articulated in the following section. In making the shift towards the Middle East, the most
helpful analysis of public opinion is provided by Daniel Yankelovick.74
Yankelovick’s revisionist perspective concerns democratic publics, but provides a useful
means of distinguishing between “good” and “bad” public judgments. Yankelovick first
provides a definition for “quality,” which provides a basis for distinguishing between good and
bad. The quality of public opinion is good “when the public accepts responsibility for the
consequences of its views” and it is bad “when the public, for whatever reason, is unprepared to
do so.”75 Two additional defining characteristics include the firmness with which an individual
adheres to a judgment, and the degree to which a given judgment contradicts the values
expressed by judgments in related issue areas.76 The value of Yankelovick’s approach is in
placing the quality determiner on what an individual does with the knowledge they possess,
rather than how much knowledge they possess. Even among revisionists, few have done this so

74

Yankelovich 1991
Ibid p24
76
Ibid p31
75

61 Stewart-Smith

effectively as Yankelovick. The driving forces behind this approach are observations in which
the expression of public opinion has failed to account for likely consequences. Two of the
examples from Yankelovick’s text are especially useful. In a 1986 news poll, 65 percent of
respondents said they were in favor of a constitutional amendment that would require Congress
to balance the budget annually. When later questions included the stipulation that balancing the
budget would likely require increased federal taxes, favorability dropped to 39 percent. In
another example, specifically related to security policy, Yankelovick reviews public sentiments
directly following the taking of US hostages by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. The vehemence
with which some members of the public responded, using phrases like “nuke ‘em,” was an
instance of bad public judgment. In a third example, from Herron and Jenkins-Smith in their
analysis of public opinion and the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, we again see the
consideration of repercussions in polling data. When polled, 53 percent of American’s voiced
support for expanding the size and ensuring the technical superiority of the existing nuclear
arsenal. However, when it was included that such an expansion would require additional nuclear
testing, the percentage in favor dropped to 41 percent.77 Each of these examples illustrate
Yankelovich’s framework for distinguishing between qualities of public expression.
The two examples using polling data above are helpful in considering Yankelovich’s
maturation process of public opinion, which is furthermore a helpful explanation of the
sometimes erratic behavior of the public. While other revisionists typically rely on a critique of
survey methodologies to explain the traditionalist understanding of the capricious public,
Yankelovich introduces three stages of public opinion development. First is the consciousness
raising stage, in which a policy is introduced to the public arena. Second is the working through
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stage. As its name suggests, this describes the time when the public is considering how to judge
a particular policy or circumstance and how it fits with their existing beliefs. Finally, in the
resolution stage, the public settles on a particular set of interpretations and judgments. At this
point the public is able to produce “good” public judgments.78
Although Yankelovich largely dismisses the relevance of ideology and culture by
emphasizing the public’s understanding of ends, one of the prominent critiques of his work, there
is still room to consider the important inputs that might inform how policy ends are evaluated by
the public. Perhaps the most fundamental and influential input is the individual’s perception of
their demographic status, allowing them to evaluate how a policy will affect their life.79 Also
fundamental to the individual’s perceptions are their political beliefs as informed by ideology.
As mentioned above, Yankelovich attempts to remove ideology entirely, taking the position that
judgments heavily informed by ideology distort the logical consideration of repercussions. This
idealistic account of public opinion denies the possibility of subjective divergence from a
judgment that is assumed in Yankelovich’s assessment to be objectively good. Although
Yankelovich’s approach is the most useful under most conditions, we must accept that
circumstances exist in which ideology plays an important role in making policy judgments, and
that it is right for it do so.80 Similar to the core beliefs encompassed by ideology, “domain
perceptions” are perspectives that apply to a particular area of policy.81 Lastly, as a subdivision
of domain perceptions are beliefs specific to individual policies.82
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A more difficult question to answer than how public opinion is formed is how public
opinion comes to inform policymaking. As with the preponderance of literature on the subject,
most analyses rely on American polling data and election records, or those from other Western,
liberal democracies. It is my objective here to provide both a useful perspective on comparing
democratic governing structures with undemocratic structures with regard to public influence on
policy, and then to describe the range of activities accessible to various publics in their
interaction with policymaking elites.
The common understanding of public-government interaction in liberal societies
emphasizes the importance of the democratic process. However, when public opinion
development and communication is broken down into its component parts, the process of
electing government representation is at best secondary to the role of lobbying and other activist
projects coordinated by NGOs. Rather than thinking of government liberalism in terms of
elections, it is a more accurate reflection of the liberal policymaking apparatus to think in terms
of the degree to which the public can engage in policy dialogue and apply social pressure. While
impending elections will make elected officials more sensitive to public pressure, the role of
regular elections is similar in effect to an active protest culture in undemocratic systems,
although the latter is less consistent. It is also worth noting that the culture-producing effect of
public engagement in policymaking through track-II programs is both similar to, and may be a
precursor to, the culture-production of elections. Understanding the relationship between public
opinion and policy makers in these terms allows us to draw more useful comparisons between
the research done in liberal societies, and the future of Middle Eastern politics. In other words,
where political cultures and governing systems operate differently, parallels may exist between
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publics and how individuals formulate their opinions, and the means through which they
influence their respective governments.

Figure 4: The scale presents a variety of means for
public expression, ranging from most extreme on
the left, to the most liberal on the right. Although
activities on the left can be present in varying
degrees of liberal and authoritarian societies, note
that those on the right are only accessible in liberal
societies.

In order to better evaluate the interaction between publics and governments, I have
identified a range of five activities in the realm of public expression, as portrayed in figure 4.
The first level, furthest to the left of the diagram, includes only the most violent activities, often
with malicious intentions, which accounts for everything from outright revolt, to vandalism, to
insurgency. This level of analysis includes only the most extreme cases of violent public
expression. The second level is violent protest. The line between revolt and violent protest is
fine, and the former may evolve into the latter. The third level is peaceful protest. For example,
consider the Egyptian protests during the winter of 2010. While there were violent acts
perpetrated by some members of these protests, the movement as a hole was peaceful and was
not characterized by violent conflict with the entrenched authority. I refer to the fourth level as
“institutional activism.” Public engagement efforts in this category are lead and facilitated by
NGOs. In the earlier review of NGO activities in the Middle East, many of the projects listed
would fall into this category. However, it is important to recognize that within this category
there are varying degrees of interaction between the NGO managers and the public they
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represent, hence the subdivision of the category between activism by elites, and representative
activism. As contact with the public increases, the activity moves nearer to the fifth level,
broadly identified as “liberal activism.” These sorts of activities include examples such as
petition projects and letter-writing campaigns. Liberal activism entails a high degree of
individual autonomy and freedom of political expression.
In considering NGO projects in the Middle East, the most important goal should be to
broaden public accessibility to more levels along the spectrum, while diminishing reliance on
those forms of public expression furthest to the left. Note that protest is generally a healthy
political activity, and the maintenance of a protest culture in the Middle East need not be to the
exclusion of more liberal forms of political expression. Broadening the means of public
expression will increase the legitimacy of public opinion, and eventually facilitate a healthy
relationship between the mass public and government, with the NGO community as an
intermediary. Under the status quo, one of the greatest struggles faced by NGOs is the
communication of their goals and activities to the mass public. This failure becomes problematic
when in cases such as the Search for Common Ground project in 1993, where media and mass
public reactions brought about the collapse of an otherwise promising policy dialogue. If a
coalition of NGOs is going to be any more successful than the existing dispersal of independent
NGO projects, it must improve public relations across the region. Even moderate success in this
endeavor will provide an improved public foundation for regional reconciliation and cooperation
than exists today.
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Part III: The Goals, Structure, and Encumbrances of a Track-II Coalition
Track II v. Track I
In beginning the discussion of a possible track II coalition, addressing its participants,
goals, and structure, it is helpful to outline why the unofficial option is more favorable at this
juncture than the more commonly proposed official approaches. To start, in the existing
scholarship on the subject, some of the most notable authors have suggested that further track II
activities could be beneficial in the development of positive security relations in the region.83 In
fact, Spiegel opened a recent publication on Middle East security by acknowledging that track II
projects may be the most appropriate option for the international community given the current
regional climate.84 He later recognizes that it may be necessary to “develop an informal, even at
times unofficial, structure to maintain ongoing discussions, build confidence, and at a minimum
discuss disagreements.”85 Unfortunately, neither Spiegel nor Jones provides more than a
sentence or two on the subject, and to the extent they clarify their track II recommendations, the
emphasis is functionally the same as their track I proposals. They do not avail themselves of the
flexibility, influence, and public engagement which can be achieved through an unofficial effort.
The most important advantage in pursuing a track II solution as compared to an official
regime is the ability to cultivate security and diplomatic norms. Much of the literature on Middle
East security finds that the creation of a security regime, with a robust network of CSBM, will
propagate norms between regional governments. Comparisons to precedent-setting regimes in
other regions, such as ASEAN, support this conclusion. However, the second half of the
twentieth century and first decade of the twenty-first have time and again showed an
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unwillingness amongst regional governments to settle on the terms of an inclusive regional
organization. The issues network in the Middle East is such that too many competing interests
have prevented the development of consensus to the extent required for the first steps in creating
a regime. Fortunately, NGOs do not have the same restrictions on who they partner with. The
potential risks of participating in an unofficial coalition are rarely prohibitive, and in many cases,
participation would be complimentary to the collective missions of the various NGOs. For
example, a partnership between The Search for Common Ground and the Cooperative
Monitoring Center would combine their respective expertise in political resolution and defense
policy to better facilitate dialogue on security issues. Through the success of NGO partnerships,
there is an increased likelihood that a new political culture could emerge among political elites.
This development would better prepare the region for the establishment of an official security
regime. Without the track II coalition, academics and policy analysts can only sit and hope that
political conditions shift in favor of their regime designs.
Political and economic conditions, as one of the greatest barriers to the creation of a
security regime, would likely require reform before an official regime could take hold.86 In most
proposals, and for most international precedents, these reforms are agreed upon by member
countries prior to formally becoming members to the regime. As states meet these agreed upon
requirements by the founding states they become eligible for entry. An unofficial coalition
provides a forum for pursuing these reforms and building consensus around appropriate
standards. Not only does the track II approach provide a forum for developing reforms to create
a foundation for a security regime, but NGOs by their nature are better positioned to work with
public interests, such as a growing business community that would support economic and

86

Spiegel 2004

68 Stewart-Smith

political reformation. Spiegel points out that the expanding regional business community,
emerging just in the last few decades, has increasingly favored reconciliation in the region
because they want better access to regional and global markets. An unofficial coalition could
work with these interests to mutual advantage, while for these private entities it would be more
difficult to interact with an official regime.
Perhaps the most obvious advantage of an unofficial coalition is the irrelevance of the
prohibitive concerns felt by governments entering into international arrangements. The three
barriers to the creation of a security regime identified earlier, political and economic stability,
and the potential for balance of power rivalries, have no bearing on NGOs. In addition to these
three broad scale barriers, progress in the Middle East is often slowed by the competition of
issues. Recall for instance the earlier discussion of the ACRS process, which while at first
appearing promising, was eventually derailed by an overemphasis on Israel and Palestine lead by
Egyptian representatives. The bureaucratic slowness inherent in any official international
organization renders efforts open to this sort of failure. While it stands to reason that NGOs will
be likely to collaborate because of their overlapping missions, they will maintain a great degree
of independence within the coalition. The flexibility of an unofficial organization will allow the
coalition to undertake, as they already do, a variety of issues simultaneously between different
groupings of coalition members and different focus states. The failure to resolve one issue will
not cripple ongoing efforts with different issues, while progress in one area could still potentially
benefit another. As issues are resolved in this piecemeal fashion, the barriers preventing states
from entering a new regime under the status quo would gradually be reduced. The easing of
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tensions in this manner will open the way for the pressure of overlapping strategic interests and
domestic and public pressures to move the region towards a sustainable official regime.87

Goals
The overarching goal of a track II coalition in the Middle East is to establish a regional
network capable of providing a foundation for the development of an official security regime.
This process would occur in three stages. The first stage is of course the establishment of the
NGO network. Building from the successes of an integrated NGO community, it will eventually
be possible to establish a security forum for regional governments. This would be a centralized
institution acknowledged by as many states as possible as a forum for the resolution of disputes.
The final stage will be the establishment of a centrally organized institution that will eventually
resemble the institutional structure of ASEAN. This organization could develop subordinate
working groups for each region, a regional court for adjudicating disputes, and an assortment of
offices responsible for specific policy areas. Recall the four categories of regimes introduced in
the beginning of Part II: legal, restrictive, cooperative, and allied. When considering the
coalition itself, it would obviously fall outside any of the categories presented earlier and
represents the least-integrated form of regime possible. As the coalition evolves it will gradually
increase participants, both NGOs and governments. The first step beyond a track-II coalition
will likely be a legal regime having to do with either environmental or economic policy. Success
in later stages of regime development will the success of existing efforts on more contentious
policies, such as those undertaken by CWCC to promote the universality of the Chemical
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Weapons Convention. With regionally inclusive CSBMs as a foundation, the creation of a
restrictive or cooperative regime will become increasingly likely.
The primary force at work in the progression between the three stages is the diffusion of
norms. Recall the discussion of the norm “lifecycle” from Finnemore and Sikkink. This
understanding of norm development moves between norm emergence, realignment, norm
cascade, and internalization. The activities sponsored by the members of the track-II coalition
are the points of emergence for the new diplomatic and security norms which will provide a
foundation for improved regional relations in the long-run. As norms spread between publics
and elites, the process of realignment will occur in which government interests and behaviors
shift to reflect the spreading norms. In this sense, realignment would occur so that state interests
overlay with projects facilitated by the coalition and treaties that have successfully implemented
treaties. Facilitating realignment, as a component of norm diffusion, is one of the central
functions of the coalition. Following the potentially lengthy realignment process, a norm
cascade will occur among newly aligned governments, after which, the broad internalization of
norms will create an environment conducive to the creation of a robust and inclusive security
regime.
As discussed in the section addressing security norms, norm diffusion can be supported
through civil society interactions with governments, publics, and other civil society institutions.
The primary operating goal that should dictate both the types of projects the coalition undertakes
and the manner in which they pursue them is the diffusion of favorable norms and the
development of a healthy regional political culture. Diplomatic and security norms will diffuse
through elite interactions and public engagement (recall figure three) and in some instances be
codified in bilateral and multilateral agreements. These activities are considered CSBMs under
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the definition from Intriligator, introduced in Part II. Under this understanding of CSBMs, it is
worthwhile to promote not only military engagement, but also political and economic
engagement in the form of bilateral or multilateral partnerships on issues of shared importance.
For example, some members of the coalition could work to engage regional partners in dialogue
concerning possible solutions to the annual water shortages faced across the region.
Environmental policy is not often included in a list of potentially fruitful CSBMs, however, as a
shared regional concern, if effectively integrated into a regional approach, environmental policy
stands to provide a catalyst for norm diffusion that is as effective as traditional alternatives.
The development of new policies through cooperation between coalition partners and
between governments should, of course, be a part of the coalition’s operating plan, but it should
not be the primary goal. These policy discussions should be thought of as a catalyst for
developing cooperative relationships, regardless of the outcome of specific dialogues. Most
importantly, the success and failure of the coalition should not be judged based solely on the
number of successful policies its projects produce (although successful policies will be an
indicator that the broader goal of norm diffusion is progressing). If track II projects result in new
policies, it should be thought of as a positive byproduct of the coalition’s operation.
A final goal of the coalition is to improve the quality of public opinion. This goal is
central to the public engagement mission of the coalition. Recall Yankelovich’s emphasis on an
appropriate consideration of ends in the formation of “good” public judgments. Yankelovich
provides a framework for determining the validity of an opinion, where the practical implications
of his perspective require improved educational programs to more effectively and accurately
convey policy. By engaging in educational programs the coalition will work to improve the
quality of public opinion among mass publics, informed publics, and elites. Like each of the
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goals described in this section, this is an enormous undertaking that will require a great deal of
time and collaboration within a broadly inclusive coalition.

Structure and Function
In this section it is helpful to recall Almond’s five components of society described at the
end of Part II in the public opinion section: government, media, interest groups, the attentive
public, the mass public. It is also helpful to recall figure two, which presents a visualization of
the interactions between the five components and the coalition.
To begin the description of the coalition’s operating structure, we must consider the
participants. The NGOs and projects reviewed in the first section are representative of the types
of organizations that would make up the composition of the coalition. It is important to have a
diversity of institutions participating in order to maximize the effectiveness of the coalition as a
whole. Participants should include independent research centers, universities, businesses, think
tanks, advocacy groups, and monitoring centers. Although a significant majority of these groups
ought to be based in the Middle East, it will be appropriate to involve international groups in
order to access the breadth of expertise available in the international NGO community.
Participants should not be limited to organizations with security-related missions. The variety of
policy issues peripherally relevant to security policy in the Middle East requires a depth and
breadth of specialties be incorporated in the coalition. The Institute on Global Conflict and
Cooperation, the AAAS, the CWCC, SIPRI, the Search for Common Ground, and the
Cooperative Monitoring Center focus primarily on security issues, but from differing
approaches. The AAAS supports projects designed to build relationships in the scientific
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community. The Cooperative Monitoring Center trains military and political leadership in
verification measures and technology supporting arms control treaties and an array of CSBM.
The Search for Common Ground focuses its work on supporting negotiations between
governments and building political relationships. An expanded coalition would build on this
foundation with organizations facilitating government-business relationships in the region and
policy-specific organizations (refugees, resource scarcity, etc.). Finally, the membership of the
coalition must be drawn from as many states as possible, without too heavy a concentration in
any one place. It will be necessary to include participants from important peripheral states as
well, such as Iran, Turkey, and possibly Pakistan and Afghanistan. This will be the most
challenging consideration in building the coalition.
It is unreasonable to expect upwards of one hundred private institutions to participate in a
collaborative organization from the start, so the coalition will grow in stages, as described earlier
in the Goals section. This gradual process of increasing regional inclusivity will likely resemble
something similar to the process undertaken by the CWCC, where with each event sponsored by
the coalition they draw a larger assembly and increase their membership. The most important
first step is to establish a core assembly of participants from the region. Ideally this would
include participants from nearly all states in the region, but at least the key states: Israel, Syria,
Egypt, and Iran. These four states are typically identified as the key components to any
sustainable regional solution. The omission of any one of them would undermine the integrity of
the coalition, and from a track II perspective it will be necessary to have NGOs based in these
countries in order to facilitate cooperation with the government on policy issues and the eventual
creation of an official regime. This early group of NGOs would establish the guiding principles
for the coalition, the organizational structure, and a plan for growth and development. The
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guiding principles of this organization must not explicitly exclude any governments or NGOs
from participating in coalition projects. From this foundation, the coalition will gradually extend
its membership to include more political ideologies and economic sectors in more countries. In
order to maintain representational balance across the region, it may be appropriate to restrict the
number of participants allowed to join from a single country by creating a ratio quota. For
example, it may be acceptable for three Israeli participants and one Saudi Arabian participant to
enter at the start, but before a fourth Israeli institution can enter the coalition, there must be
increased representation from Saudi Arabia. Alternatively, these quotas could be organized by
region. This approach would encourage sub-networks of NGOs from across the Middle East to
collaborate and join the coalition at the same time, in order to maintain balanced representation.
These specifics for managing growth would be articulated in the coalition’s guiding principles.
I divide the rest of the discussion of the structure and function of the coalition into two
components reflecting the structure of the issues presented in this paper. First is the function of
the coalition as a norm-diffusion apparatus. The coalition will create an environment to
collaborate and discuss. The projects undertaken by the coalition will be similar in structure to
those reviewed earlier, and will involve dialogue between NGOs, between governments, and
even between different departments of the same government. One of the strengths of the
coalition will be the ability to track participants in various projects and to build on the successes
of previous projects. Under the status quo, NGO projects primarily occur in isolation, so when
they conclude or collapse, it is difficult to salvage the areas of the project in which progress was
made. For an example of where this sort of engagement would be beneficial, consider the
bureaucratic cultures of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and the Israeli Defense Ministry as
expressed in the ACRS proceedings. By their behavior, it is clear the Egyptian Foreign Ministry
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is inclined to adhere more nearly to international diplomatic and security norms, whereas the
Israeli Defense Ministry favors “uncompromising self-reliance.”88 Further complicating matters,
in the process of establishing the guiding principles in the ACRS process, while the two
bureaucratic components of the Egyptian-Israeli policymaking apparatus had conflicting
opinions, the negotiating leadership of the two countries expressed unified support. Cases such
as this are the reason the operations of the coalition should anticipate coordinating collaboration
between branches and departments in the same government, in addition to their international
projects.
By hosting these projects, and maintaining unprecedented continuity and collaboration
between projects, the coalition will enable regional elites to develop a rapport. Incidents such as
in 1978, when Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin called the Egyptian Foreign Minister a
“young man” during a meeting, would be more easily avoided.89 Although the Prime Minister’s
intention was benign, the remark was considered condescending and after the Egyptian
delegation departed it took months to reestablish a stable dialogue. Increased encounters
between elites will foster better relationships in the long run, especially if they are part of a
sustained regional effort.
Much of this work will be manifest in the form of regular meetings, policy forums, and
summits, each with varying degrees of public access and international inclusiveness. As an
organizational mechanism for these activities, the coalition should be organized around a Middle
East Center for Cooperation. Although it is possible the Center for Cooperation could be
established with a single headquarters, it may be necessary to create multiple regional offices.
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Location aside, the importance of the Center for Cooperation is as a central (institutionally, not
necessarily geographically) hub for coordinating regional track II projects. Much of the work
undertaken by the Center for Cooperation would be divided between administrators at the
various member organizations, at least until funding could be secured to found a separate
institution, specifically tied to the coalition and operating in that central coordinating role. The
work of the Center for Cooperation should be conducted digitally in the early years of the
coalition, especially if a central location is not identified.
Although in the context of a track II coalition a central coordinating hub like the Center
for Cooperation is unique, the idea is drawn from the organization structure of existing security
regimes and many of the proposals for a regime in the Middle East. For instance, the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the coordinating body for the
CWC. The proposals for official regimes articulated by Evron and in the SIPRI report also call
for central bodies for monitoring, coordination, dialogue, and enforcement.90 Most nearly related
to the proposal for the Middle East Center for Cooperation is the regional security institute
described by Spiegel.91 The security institute would provide NGO input on issues under
discussion through official government negotiations.
The second component to the operations of the coalition relates to public opinion and the
ability of NGOs to engage with and respond to the public. It is helpful here to recall figure two,
which depicts the ways in which NGOs interact with the various components of the public. On
this subject, operations must necessarily be bidirectional; the coalition should work to express
public sentiments to governments, while also serving an educational role in their projects
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involving the public. In both types of projects, consider Yankelovich’s interpretation of public
judgments; it will be important to refine public opinion to improve the quality of public
judgments in order to make the expression of these judgments more compelling for government
elites.
In 2000, Yasser Arafat refused to negotiate at Camp David because he perceived a
significant opposition from the Palestinian public. He cited the growing popularity of Hamas
and the Islamic Jihad as reasons for not making concessions in negotiations with Israel. 92 It is
easy to dismiss Arafat’s behavior as ploy to strengthen his bargaining position. While in some
instances this may be the case, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, to categorically dismiss
appeals to public pressure would be overly cynical. Political officials feel the pressures of public
opinion in a variety of ways, not at all limited to democratic elections. Under the status quo, the
two most common expressions of public opinion in the Middle East are nonviolent and violent
protest. The coalition would be positioned to provide an additional channel of communication.
NGOs will be able to coordinate domestic survey initiatives to better evaluate public opinion on
regional security issues. As part of a coalition, NGOs will be uniquely able to gather data from a
variety of regional publics. One of the most challenging aspects to evaluating Middle East
public opinion is the dearth of reliable data, so this function of the coalition will be tremendously
valuable to analysts and policy makers. As the coalition matures, is recognized by more
governments, and increases its work with the public, it will be possible to assist in coordinating
petition campaigns. Petitions can be an excellent tactic in conveying public opinion. Similar
efforts already exist through social media outlets, but they are organizationally weak and often
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unfocused. The coalition could provide legitimacy to these public activities and increase their
effectiveness.
As the coalition will include research institutions in its membership, the coalition stands
to make significant contributions to public opinion research beyond the limited confines of
conveying public opinion to governments. In this sort of research endeavor, it is important to
recall Surowiecki’s four components in the correct interpretation of public opinion: information
diversity, independence, decentralization, and aggregation. As previously discussed, public
opinion research in the Middle East is hampered by the lack of reliable data (i.e. non-government
sources). Of particular interest is the ability to better gauge the divides in public opinion
between interest groups, cultures, age groups, geographical locations, and by socioeconomic
status. The hope is that over time it will be possible to reproduce the sort of research provided
by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, used earlier in reference to public decision-making
and the role played by ideology in formulating public opinion. The structure of the coalition
makes it the ideal entity for this sort of research as it meets with each of Surowiecki’s four
criteria. Undertaking this sort of work in the Middle East will both enhance the general
understanding of public opinion, specifically as it relates to foreign policy, and it will help guide
the educational programs sponsored by the coalition.
In addition to gauging public opinion, it is important that accurate information also flow
in the opposite direction. To this effect, the coalition should host educational programs on all
issues in which they engage. In reviewing track II projects since they came into their prime in
the 1990s, it becomes clear that this is both one of the most important functions of an NGO
project, and one of the worst executed. Most educational programs are intended for elite
education; that is, academics, policymakers, etc. While these high level programs will still serve
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a purpose, they are no substitute for public engagement. Recall the stages of track II operations
from Part I: socialization, filtering, and policy inaction. As identified earlier, the filtering
process is usually where track II projects encounter the most problems. Traditionally, the
filtering stage involves conveying the results of track II discussion from the isolated group of
direct participants to their constituent governments. This version of filtering must be expanded
in order to engage the public. The composition of the coalition should enable its various
members to develop a balanced account of security issues which are too often mired in rhetoric
and hyperbole. Media outreach, public forums, and pamphleting movements will serve as the
mechanisms for public education. The success of these projects will help improve the quality of
public judgments, which have been stunted in some places by state media and an overabundance
of rhetorical expression.
With regard to public expression, part of the purpose of the coalition should be to move
the manner of interaction between publics and governments from the bottom of the scale, nearer
to the top (recall the five-tier account from before). Rather than resorting to violence, especially
when the resort to violence is a fringe behavior and can delegitimize similarly minded peaceful
activities, it should be possible to gradually work towards conditioning publics and governments
to interact through peaceful means of public discourse. Much of this behavior would be
empowered through democratic processes, but the existence of democracy should not be taken as
a precondition.
While one of the primary functions of the coalition is to coordinate activities with
regional governments, it is worth considering the manner in which extra-regional governments
should be permitted to participate, particularly with regard to Western governments. Many
NGOs in the ME already have connections with the West. However, Western officials should be
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limited in their ability to participate in the early stages of the coalition development. As the
coalition develops, and a regionally representative group of states decides to participate, it will
be possible to incorporate the limited involvement of western officials. Ideally, extra regional
governments will only become involved when the coalition is strong enough, and has the favor
and participation of enough regional governments, that serious talks can begin around an official
regional security regime. At that stage it is not unusual to have extra regional stake holders
become involved, if only to voice their support for the principles of the emerging regime. At the
unofficial level, this sort of involvement would be less constructive as the primary goal of the
coalition is to engage with regional publics and build relationships between regional elites.
Foreign governments would have little to contribute, and their involvement would be more likely
to derail early progress than to advance regional cooperation. This represents a significant
divergence from the norms of the field; most considerations of Middle East security involve
highly integrated participation from either the United States or European Governments. The
difference of opinion is explained by the difference in approach. The types of participants in a
track II coalition with the goals articulated above are necessarily different from those participants
typically considered by isolated track II projects or official negotiating processes. The early
stages of the coalition are intended for building regional relationships, and extra-regional
influences are neither necessary nor conducive to achieving this goal.
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Barriers to Success

The evolution of the proposed coalition will not go unopposed. A prime example of
overt interference was on display in late 2011 when Egyptian Security Forces halted the
operations of 17 NGOs.93 This sort of government interference will certainly continue in many
parts of the region. As the coalition develops, some projects will set it at odds with certain
governments, particularly projects having to do with public engagement. It is likely that some
coalition members will be prohibited from operating for periods of time, or will cease to exist
entirely. This is of course a challenge already faced by many NGOs in the region, especially
those working on security-related issues. As members of a coalition, with the support of at least
some regional governments, it can be hoped that NGOs will be less likely to face restrictions by
governments. This problem will be most pronounced in the early stages of development, but as
the coalition grows, becomes better established, and gains regional support and representation, it
will become increasingly difficult for governments to abuse NGO coalition members.
Government restrictions on NGOs are not necessarily overt. The efforts of the COE to
promote citizenship rights in Europe involved collaboration between both governments and
NGOs. In the case of Russian involvement addressed earlier in Part II, the Moscow School of
Political Studies was one of the few NGOs permitted to participate in COE forums and
workshops.94 However, after participating in these projects, the Moscow School was often shut
out by the government and prevented from contributing to the policymaking process. This sort
of barrier, although less overt, is in some ways more pernicious and threatening to the success of
93
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the coalition. Although the coalition will be able to pursue new collaborative research efforts
and advocacy programs, their long term success is dependent on their ability to work with
regional governments. Recall the remainder of Checkel’s case study on the COE and the
diffusion of citizenship norms. Given the changing governance conditions in parts of the Middle
East, there is little to gain from trying to fit regional governments into Checkel’s categories (state
over society, statist, corporatist, and liberal). However, we can safely acknowledge that the
region presents an array of states along the spectrum, although heavily concentrated on the statist
end. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the variances within each section should be taken into
consideration. For instance, between two statist societies, one may have a particularly influential
commercial industry with greater access to government officials than their domestic
counterparts. Alternatively, instead of influential business elites, an example nearer to the
circumstances faced in Russia could exist; an institution for higher education may be positioned
to gain better access to members of the government than the likely limited NGO community.
These considerations are important because they make clear the necessity of maintaining a
diverse membership in the coalition. Some approaches will be successful in one country, but
different circumstances leave them fruitless in others.
Of the many logistical concerns a new coalition will face, the most potentially damaging
is the identification of funding sources. The startup costs of the coalition should be moderate,
considering it will consist mostly of agreeing with other Middle East organizations on terms of
collaboration and resource-sharing. As the coalition develops it will be necessary to identify
additional funding sources to support the expanded projects. Returning to the Egypt example, of
the 17 NGOs affected, two were based in the United States and were funded by Congress with
the mission of monitoring democratic processes and promoting democratic values
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internationally. In this instance, the source of funding for the two NGOs influenced how they
were perceived by the government. Among the NGO projects operating in the Middle East
today, many are supported by Western governments. For instance, the CWCC is currently
pursuing funding from a number of European governments to support an upcoming summit in
the Middle East. The Coalition must be cognizant of their funding support, and how funding
sources can inform both public and government perception of their activities.
The final barrier worth mentioning is the potential for government participation to
gradually diminish as the coalition grows. As mentioned previously, the primary concern of the
coalition is to facilitate dialogue and engage regional publics in security policy for the purpose of
norm propagation and the improvement of public opinion. However, it must be noted that if the
coalition persists in the absence of some display of concrete achievements, government
willingness to participate may fade. Of the critiques included in this section this is the least
worrisome, primarily because government officials are largely accustomed to getting very little
accomplished, but also because the scope of the envisioned coalition will almost certainly obtain
concrete policies in the tertiary areas of economics and the environment.

Conclusions
When track-II projects in the Middle East have occurred over the last two decades they
function almost identically as their official counterparts, especially in cases where government
representatives are present. Because they operate the same way, these projects are vulnerable to
the same weaknesses inherent in government relations. State interests and entrenched rhetoric
keep governments in the Middle East apart. Track-II programs ought to be able to capitalize
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more effectively on what makes them fundamentally different from official government
programs; NGOs are not restricted by state interests, their current operations show a willingness
to engage across the region, and their work makes an effort to transcend debilitating state
rhetoric. In order to better realize the potential of these attributes it is necessary to forge a
coalition of NGO partners that is regionally inclusive and that can lay a foundation for a future of
stable government relations.
With such a variety of NGOs working in the Middle East, many of them with overlapping
or complimentary missions, the only remaining question is why NGOs have not become better
integrated already. To a large extent, this can be explained by the barriers to NGO projects
identified at the end of Part II. However, as was also explained, by collaborating NGOs may
mitigate some of the risks of acting independently. A more likely and more frustrating
explanation is that the right people in the NGO community have yet to try.
The driving force behind this paper was dissatisfaction with existing literature evaluating
track II projects, and perhaps even more so, the literature analyzing prospects for developing
official Middle East security regimes. In the case of the former, contributors time and again
identify the importance of altering the status quo security culture through track II projects, but
then fall short of suggesting a proposal that would provide the longevity and consistency
required do something as massively challenging as altering the political culture of an entire
region. In the case of the latter, contributors call upon the spreading of “norms” and “culture” to
explain the importance of some future security regime, but they do not adequately acknowledge
the integral role of such norms in the establishment of a security regime. This paper is an
attempt to address these shortcomings by providing a short-term recommendation for how to
influence the long-term future of Middle East security.
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